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Article

Veblen Brands
Jeremy N. Sheff

†

Then they yelled at the ones who had stars at the start,
“We’re exactly like you! You can’t tell us apart.
We’re all just the same, now, you snooty old smarties!
And now we can go to your frankfurter parties!”
“Good grief!” groaned the ones who had stars at the first.
“We’re still the best Sneetches and they are the worst.
But, now, how in the world will we know,” they all frowned,
“If which kind is what, or the other way round?”
Then up came McBean with a very sly wink
And he said, “Things are not quite as bad as you think.
So you don’t know who’s who. That is perfectly true.
But come with me, friends. Do you know what I’ll do?
I’ll make you, again, the best Sneetches on beaches
1
And all it will cost you is ten dollars eaches.”

† Associate Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. This
Article was selected for inclusion in the 2011 Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum at Stanford Law School. I am grateful to participants in that forum, as
well as those in the 10th Annual Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at
the University of California at Berkeley, the First Annual Tri-State Region
Intellectual Property Workshop at Fordham Law School, the 2011 Works-InProgress in Intellectual Property Colloquium at Boston University School of
Law, and the Junior Faculty Colloquium at Touro Law Center, for their
thoughtful comments and questions. I am also grateful for comments on earlier drafts from Professors Katya Assaf, Barton Beebe, Marc DeGirolami, Laura
Heymann, Paul Kirgis, Mark Lemley, Peter Menell, Mark Movsesian, Lisa
Ramsey, Jennifer Rothman, Jessica Silbey, Keith Sharfman, Rebecca Tushnet,
and Adam Zimmerman. Additional thanks to Christopher Holtz for able research assistance. All errors are the author’s alone. Copyright © 2012 by Jeremy N. Sheff.
1. DR. SEUSS, THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STORIES 12–15 (1961).
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INTRODUCTION
Soon after Sonia Sotomayor was nominated to the Supreme
Court, the New York Times ran a lengthy profile of the prospec2
tive Justice on its front page. Describing her stint in private
3
practice at a “boutique commercial law firm in Manhattan,”
the Times reported:
A large part of Ms. Sotomayor’s work was fighting the counterfeiters who copied products of Fendi, the luxury goods company, and its
well-known ‘double F ’ logo. Sometimes, that meant suing counterfeiters to stop them from importing fake Fendi goods.
At other times, it involved more derring-do: if the firm had a tip
from the United States Customs Office about a suspicious shipment,
Ms. Sotomayor would often be involved in the risky maneuver of going to the warehouse to have the merchandise seized. One incident
that figures largely in firm lore was a seizure in Chinatown, where
the counterfeiters ran away, and Ms. Sotomayor got on a motorcycle
4
and gave chase.

This image stood out in the field of Justice Sotomayor’s
substantial accomplishments. The New Yorker declared that
the motorcycle anecdote “may be the best passage in the Times
5
6
profile,” and other mainstream media outlets agreed. Of
7
course, the story had been somewhat romanticized, but it
hardly mattered. Americans now had a mental image of one of
our nation’s highest judicial officers in her righteous youth,
2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Trailblazer and a Dreamer, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 2009, at A1.
3. Id. at A19.
4. Id.
5. Amy Davidson, A Motorcycle, a Playground, and a Justice, NEW
YORKER: NEWS DESK, ( May 27, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/
newsdesk/2009/05/close-read-a-motorcycle-a-playground-and-a-justice.html.
6. See, e.g., Karen Sloan, As IP Boutique Litigator, Former Partners Say
Sotomayor Was a Quick Study, Hard Worker, N.Y. L.J., May 29, 2009, at 2 (citing the Times’s description of the motorcycle chase as evidence of Sotomayor’s
“fearless” nature); Holly Bailey, Sotomayor, Action Star?, NEWSWEEK: DAILY
BEAST ( May 27, 2009, 2:11 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/
blogs/the-gaggle/2009/05/27/sotomayor-action-star.html (expressing surprise
at Sotomayor’s participation in a motorcycle chase).
7. See Andrew Cohen, Is Sotomayor Supremely Stylish? VF DAILY (June
5, 2009, 2:27 PM), http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2009/06/is-sotomayor
-supremely-stylish (“Turns out that Judge Sotomayor, when she was in private
practice, represented both [Fendi and Ferrari] in litigation against those who
sought to sell knockoffs of the brand. She disclosed that she once spent an afternoon in a bulletproof vest tooling around Shea Stadium on a motorcycle
chasing counterfeiters. No, she was not driving the motorcycle. And, no, she
did not evidently enjoy it. But she did enjoy the ‘Fendi Crush,’ a lawenforcement promotion wherein counterfeited products were crushed in garbage trucks.”).
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boldly tearing through the narrow streets of a rough neighborhood in pursuit of a gang of cowardly lawbreakers.
Beneath the surface of this law-and-order morality play,
however, is a deeper narrative playing on a host of social, economic, and racial undercurrents. This narrative pits Justice
8
Sotomayor—a case study of play-by-the-rules social mobility
between the working-class Puerto Rican communities of the
East Bronx and the largely white, male legal institutions of up9
per-middle-class Manhattan —against faceless, grasping, and
10
unscrupulous Asian immigrants from the outer boroughs. And
of course, standing behind the future Justice and directing her
actions are the modern-day equivalents of old-world aristocra11
cy: Fendi, a venerable Italian fashion house, owned by a Par12
is-based multinational luxury brand holding company, and
13
run by a platinum-haired celebrity German artistic director.
In short, this one vignette is a microcosm of global competition
14
over wealth and status —a competition that manifests itself in
8. Remarks to the Democratic Leadership Council, 1 PUB. PAPERS 40
(Jan. 12, 2002) (“The main idea here is still the old idea of the American
dream, that if you work hard and play by the rules, you ought to have a decent
life and a chance for your children to have a better one.”).
9. See Stolberg, supra note 2, at A18–A19.
10. As the Vanity Fair follow-up to the New York Times profile makes
clear, the motorcycle episode actually took place in the area around Shea Stadium, the former home of the New York Mets in Queens County. Cohen, supra
note 6. This area claims the most ethnically diverse population and the largest
immigrant population in the country, including two major concentrations of
Chinese-born immigrants. Noel Pangilinan, Who Are the People in Your Neighborhood: NYC Immigrants by the Numbers, QUEENS7.COM (Feb. 21, 2011)
http://queens7.com/who-are-the-people-in-your-neighborhoods-nyc’s-immigrants
-by-the-number/.
11. See History, FENDI, http://mobile.fendi.com/en/forever-fendi/history (last
visited Oct. 3, 2011) (placing the fashion house’s origins in Rome in 1925).
12. MOËT HENNESSY LOUIS VUITTON, LVMH: PASSIONATE ABOUT CREATIVITY, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 25 (2010), http://www.lvmh.com/uploads/assets/
Com-fi/Documents/en/LVMH_RA_2010_GB.pdf [hereinafter LVMH] ( listing
Fendi as one of twelve brands in its parent company’s “fashion and leather
goods business group”).
13. See Cathy Horyn & Eric Wilson, When the Label Says Lagerfeld, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, at G1 (“There is no bigger star in fashion today than Karl
Lagerfeld.”); LVMH, supra note 12, at 28 (identifying Karl Lagerfeld as
Fendi’s artistic director).
14. Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 202–03 (1949)
(“Throughout recorded time . . . there have been three kinds of people in the
world, the High, the Middle, and the Low. . . . The aims of these three groups
are entirely irreconcilable. The aim of the High is to remain where they are.
The aim of the Middle is to change places with the High. The aim of the Low,
when they have an aim—for it is an abiding characteristic of the Low that
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the struggle for control of a luxury brand across the various
cross-cutting cleavages in American society.
The subject of this Article is the legal regime that regulates
this struggle. Justice Sotomayor’s clients retained her to enforce their rights under federal trademark law. These rights—
whether asserted under statutory provisions relating to simple
trademark infringement or the more specialized provisions re15
lating to trademark counterfeiting —are grounded in the doc16
trine of post-sale confusion. Trademark owners (and the
courts that find in their favor) invoke this doctrine to satisfy
the Lanham Act’s “likelihood of confusion” standard, which limits infringement liability to conduct that is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of [the defendant] with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of [the defendant’s] goods, services, or commercial activities by another per17
son . . . .”
Post-sale confusion is an invention of the lower federal
18
courts. The Supreme Court has never endorsed the theory, nor

they are too much crushed by drudgery to be more than intermittently conscious of anything outside their daily lives—is to abolish all distinctions and
create a society in which all men shall be equal.”).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2006) (establishing civil liability for confusing trademark uses); 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2006) (authorizing injunctive relief against trademark infringers and counterfeiters); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)–( b)
(2006 & Supp. 2010) ( providing monetary remedies against trademark infringers and heightened remedies against counterfeiters); 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)
(2006 & Supp. 2010) (establishing criminal liability for trafficking in counterfeit goods).
16. United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 808 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that
“likelihood of confusion” is an element of the federal counterfeiting offense,
and holding that a likelihood of post-sale confusion can satisfy this element);
United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347 (11th Cir. 1987); infra Part I (discussing the case law developing the concept of post-sale confusion as a basis
for trademark infringement liability).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); accord 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
18. Each of the Circuit Courts of Appeal has recognized the doctrine of
post-sale confusion in one form or another. See IP Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler
Co., 163 F.3d 27, 44 (1st Cir. 1998); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872–73 (2d Cir. 1986); Am. Home Prods. v. Barr
Labs., 834 F.2d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 1987); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc.,
816 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 132–
33 (5th Cir. 1989); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245
(6th Cir. 1991); Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 383 (7th Cir.
1996); Insty*Bit v. Poly-Tech Indus., 95 F.3d 663, 669–72 (8th Cir. 1996); Levi
Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 1980); Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Urban Gorilla, 500 F.3d 1222, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2007); Torkington,
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19

even discussed it. But for over half a century it has been the
20
key weapon in the arsenal of luxury brand owners. Given this
history, post-sale confusion as a doctrine unto itself has received surprisingly little critical attention. What literature does
exist either characterizes post-sale confusion as merely one ex21
ample of broader trends in intellectual property, or else discusses the economic or philosophical implications of luxury consumption without critically examining the underlying legal
22
doctrine that facilitates that consumption. This Article makes
a new contribution, first by critiquing the actual doctrine of
post-sale confusion, and second by examining the relationship
between that doctrine and what I claim is its unique (and heretofore overlooked) purpose: the regulation of socially expressive
consumption.
The first step in this project is to try to provide a coherent
doctrinal account of the post-sale confusion cases. As it turns
out, this is an impossible task. There is no single coherent theory of injury in post-sale confusion cases; rather, there are three.
This Article represents the first effort to distinguish among the
various theories of injury that arise under the label of “postsale confusion” and to analyze each on its own merits. As each
of these theories suffers from serious infirmity, such an effort is
long overdue.
The first theory, which I label “bystander confusion,” refers
to the following factual scenario: a defendant sells its product
812 F.2d at 1352–53; Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l Ltd., 998 F.2d
985, 989–90 ( Fed. Cir. 1993).
19. The most recent opportunity for the Court to address the theories of
post-sale and initial-interest confusion in trademark law ended in a denial of
certiorari. Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, 423 F.3d 539 (6th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1179 (2006).
20. See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
21. See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code,
123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 851–59 (2010) [hereinafter Beebe, Sumptuary Code]
(considering post-sale confusion among other theories of liability as evidence
that trademark law promotes anti-dilution and sumptuary policies); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 404 –08 (1999) (analyzing the economics of “prestige[-]good cases” and classifying them as an “example of extending property-based trademark protection under the likelihoodof-confusion standard”).
22. See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal
Street: Reflections on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381 (2005) (considering the economic effects on
producers of counterfeiting); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trademark Law and Status
Signaling: Tattoos for the Privileged, 59 FLA. L. REV. 195 (2007) (examining
utilitarian, Rawlsian and Lockean rationales for public subsidization of the
luxury economy).
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to a non-confused purchaser; observers who see the nonconfused purchaser using the defendant’s product mistake it for
the plaintiff’s product; and those observers draw conclusions
from their observations that influence their future purchasing
decisions. This theory shares similarities with more conventional theories of trademark infringement, with the distinction
that, in practice, it improperly reduces the burden on plaintiffs
from proving a “likelihood of confusion” to proving a mere pos23
sibility of confusion.
The next theory of injury—which I label “downstream confusion”—is implicated where there is a risk that a non-confused
purchaser of a knockoff or altered trademarked good might give
or resell the good to a confused recipient. This variety of postsale confusion flies in the face of long-standing Supreme Court
precedent regarding contributory infringement and trademark
24
law’s first-sale doctrine. That inconsistency, in turn, allows a
trademark infringement plaintiff to turn a losing case into a
winning case merely by changing the name of his claim.
The problems inherent in bystander and downstream confusion can be remedied by minor doctrinal refinements, although those refinements might well result in discarding the
theories as such. The more difficult issue is that both these
theories are often invoked in tandem with (and potentially as a
distraction from) the third theory of injury, which I label “status confusion.” Status confusion is the legal theory that most
often serves to justify liability against the manufacturers of
knockoff luxury branded goods, even though the purchasers of
25
those goods know full well what they are buying.
Status-confusion cases often invoke an argument owing its
origins to economist and social critic Thorstein Veblen: that individuals conspicuously consume some expensive products (a
26
Fendi handbag, say) to stake a claim to social status. As the
courts in these cases implicitly recognize, if the symbols used to
stake such claims are freely available to anyone, a classic problem of information economics arises: the claim loses its credibil27
ity—indeed its very meaning—due to indiscriminate use. In
the United States, trademark law has solved this problem by
propertizing the symbols that express the claim, driving them
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See infra Part I.A.
See infra notes 71–78 and accompanying text.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
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into a market system. By incentivizing private parties to ration
access to such symbols, status-confusion doctrine creates the
scarcity that is required for the symbols to have social
28
meaning.
This is an odd role for trademark law to play. Putting to
29
one side relatively novel and unsettled doctrines like dilution,
the conventional theoretical account of trademarks is that they
facilitate the transfer of information between buyers and
sellers regarding the source or quality of goods in the marketplace. In the status-confusion cases, however, information
about the goods themselves is essentially irrelevant to all parties concerned. Rather, the courts in those cases view the
trademarks at issue as a means of transferring information
about people: buyers consume luxury goods in view of a social
audience for the purpose of making a statement about what
kind of people they are (or aspire to be). For reasons that will
become clear, I refer to the luxury trademarks that serve this
socially expressive function (by virtue of the artificial scarcity
that trademark law permits their owners to maintain) as “Veb30
len brands.”
This Article ultimately asks whether the trademark system has any legitimate interest in creating, maintaining, and
31
regulating the market for Veblen brands, and if so, whether
the First Amendment permits the law of trademarks to be used
32
in that way. Status-confusion doctrine has the direct effect of
“restrict[ing] the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others,” an exercise of government power which the Supreme Court has stated in other
33
contexts “is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” By establishing a system of licenses for social expression and enforcing
those licenses with both monetary and injunctive remedies, the
State is entering into an expressive alliance with one (powerful) segment of society, in opposition to the expressive interests
of a different (weak) segment of society. Even if this alliance of
interests did not offend the First Amendment (and I argue it
does), it ought to offend our democratic sensibilities. I claim
that whatever government interest is at stake in the status
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See infra Part II.C.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Parts III.A–B.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976).
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confusion cases is insufficient to justify their coercive and selec34
tive restriction of social expression. Therefore, I propose that
status-confusion doctrine—and post-sale confusion doctrine as
a whole—be discarded.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I
analyzes the case law in the area of post-sale confusion, sets
out the three categories into which such cases fall, and critiques each category. Part II compares status-confusion theories to the dominant information economics account of trademark law. This comparison reveals the fundamental theoretical
disconnect between status confusion and the rest of trademark
infringement law: whereas the economic theory of trademarks
is directed at the flow of information about products, statusconfusion doctrine is directed at the flow of information about
people. Part III turns to the policy implications of this theoretical gap. Specifically, it argues that status-confusion doctrine
places an unjustified burden on First Amendment rights of social expression. Accordingly, the Article concludes by arguing
that post-sale confusion doctrine should be discarded entirely,
and replaced with a more limited doctrine focused on preventing confusion of actual or potential consumers.
I. CONFUSION ABOUT POST-SALE CONFUSION
The test for trademark infringement asks whether the defendant has “use[d] in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof ” that “is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of [the defendant] with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another per35
son.” The classic case of infringement is diversion of trade
through passing-off. This is the injury that arises when the defendant has affixed the plaintiff’s mark to the defendant’s
goods and offered them for sale, causing some purchasers who
wanted to buy the plaintiff’s goods to buy the defendant’s goods
instead, under the mistaken belief that they were actually
36
made by the plaintiff.
With the evolution of trademark doctrine through commonlaw development and amendments to the Lanham Act, this lim34. See infra Part III.C.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006).
36. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1853–63 (2007).
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ited focus on the behavior of actual purchasers at the point of
sale (and the resulting effects on competing producers) has ex37
ploded. Perhaps the most seismic change was the addition of a
38
dilution cause of action to the statute in 1995, a development
that remains unsettled as a matter of both doctrine and theory,
and is beyond the scope of the present discussion. But more
subtle shifts have been occurring within the law of infringement for decades. Emblematic of this process was the 1962
amendment that removed language limiting liability to conduct
39
that confused “purchasers.” While the legislative history of
the amendment makes clear that this change was meant to
bring confusion of potential rather than merely actual purchas40
ers into the ambit of the statute, many courts over the past
half-century have interpreted the change far more broadly,
finding infringement based on nearly any kind of confusion of
41
nearly any person at any time.
Among these expansive modern theories of infringement is
post-sale confusion. The roots of this theory of liability are almost as old as the Lanham Act itself, and yet even today the
cases are not in any kind of agreement on what post-sale confu42
sion is. Perhaps surprisingly, commentators have not yet rig37. See id. at 1896–1915. See generally Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble
with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759 (1990) (arguing that the modern expansion
of trademark law has imposed significant costs on society).
38. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104 -98, 109 Stat.
985 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (creating a
cause of action to enjoin conduct that impairs the distinctiveness or harms the
reputation of a famous trademark “regardless of the presence or absence
of . . . likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception”).
39. Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769, 771, 775.
40. H.R. REP. NO. 87-1108, at 4, 8 (1961) (“The purpose of the proposed
change is . . . to omit the word ‘purchasers,’ since the provision actually relates
to potential purchasers as well as to actual purchasers.”); S. REP. NO. 86-1685,
at 4 –5, 8 (1960) (same).
41. See, e.g., David M. Tichane, The Maturing Doctrine of Post-Sales Confusion, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 399, 403–05 (1995). Numerous commentators
have noted the seemingly unbounded expansion of the concept of “confusion”
in trademark law, and critiqued the invocation of the 1962 amendment to the
Lanham Act as a justification for that expansion. See, e.g., McKenna, supra
note 36, at 1904 –05, 1905 n.282; Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105,
160–61 (2005).
42. Some purported post-sale confusion cases do not involve post-sale confusion at all. These cases invoke post-sale confusion either in passing, or else
as a label for conduct that is better analyzed under other theories of liability.
For example, in Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., the court used the
language of post-sale liability to describe a fairly conventional point-of-sale
confusion theory, apparently because the parties sold their products through

778

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:769

orously documented this disagreement. Rather, post-sale confusion is often described as a single coherent theory of trademark
injury (albeit one that may be carelessly applied), or at worst as
a coherent theory that serves as a pretext for pursuing unstat43
ed and divergent interests. As this Part will demonstrate,
courts actually use the term “post-sale confusion” to refer to
three conceptually distinct—though in some cases overlap44
ping —theories of injury. I label these theories “bystander confusion,” “downstream confusion,” and “status confusion.”
A. BYSTANDER CONFUSION
One line of post-sale confusion cases appears consistent
with the Lanham Act’s stated purpose of extending infringement liability to confusion of potential purchasers. In its
strongest form, the theory of these cases describes an injury—
which I will refer to as “bystander confusion”—that follows
from a standard chain of events:

separate distribution channels. 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048, 1056–57 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), aff ’d, 317 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2003).
43. See, e.g., 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23.7 (4th ed. 2007) (characterizing post-sale confusion
as a form of liability that arises when “Observers See Infringing Imitations”);
Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 83, 120–23 (2010) (characterizing post-sale confusion as a doctrine designed to protect the information value of brands as signals of social status); Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note
21, at 852 (“The courts’ reasoning in [ post-sale confusion] cases is quite revealing. Courts justify their prohibition against copying on the grounds that rarity
and distinction should be promoted and preserved in light of the social functions that they play.”); see also Lunney, supra note 21, at 404 –08 (characterizing post-sale confusion as pretextually focused on speculation about observers’
future purchasing behavior but actually concerned over protecting the prestige
value of plaintiffs’ trademarks); McKenna, supra note 36, at 1907–09 (same).
44. For example, in General Motors Corp. v. Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc., the court identified six potential injuries flowing from what it referred to as “downstream confusion,” some of which correspond to this Article’s
definition of downstream confusion and others of which correspond to what
this Article refers to as “bystander confusion” or “status confusion.” 453 F.3d
351, 358 (6th Cir. 2006). In that case, the court ultimately relied on a theory of
injury corresponding to what this Article refers to as “bystander confusion,”
not “downstream confusion.” Compare id. at 359 (“Such confusion could damage GM’s reputation for quality if the public associates any inferior attributes
(e.g., improper fit or cracking) of Tong Yang’s grilles with GM. Other types of
possible downstream harm, such as that resulting from a product’s reduced
scarcity, however, are largely inapplicable to this case.”), with Part I.A, infra.
Several post-sale confusion cases are cited in this Part as examples of more
than one theory, precisely because the courts frequently fail to distinguish
among them in concluding that post-sale confusion is likely.
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 The defendant sells its product—which incorporates
some feature or combination of features that resembles a
protectable mark of the plaintiff—to an admittedly nonconfused consumer;
 The consumer uses the product in view of a potential
purchaser of the plaintiff’s product;
 The potential purchaser is confused as to the source of
the observed product, misidentifying it as having originated with the plaintiff;
 The potential purchaser, observing the defendant’s product in use, makes some negative evaluation about the
qualities of the observed product, mistakenly ascribing
that evaluation to the plaintiff ’s products;
 Under this mistaken understanding of the qualities of
the plaintiff ’s products, the potential purchaser refrains
from future purchases of the plaintiff ’s products, and po45
tentially recommends that others do likewise.
It should be noted at the outset that the bystander confusion theory is entirely consistent with broadly accepted policy
justifications for trademark enforcement. These include the information-forcing policies espoused by the “Chicago School” of
46
law and economics that dominate modern trademark theory,
as well as more traditional and limited policies against unfair

45. See, e.g., CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, 267 F.3d 660, 683 (7th Cir.
2001); Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 989–90
( Fed. Cir. 1993); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 148 (4th
Cir. 1987).
46. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51
UCLA L. REV. 621, 623–24 (2004) [hereinafter Beebe, Semiotic Analysis] (noting that the influence and acceptance of the Chicago School’s approach is
“nearly total” in American trademark law); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269–
70 (1987) (arguing that trademark enforcement ensures the integrity of information in the marketplace, thereby giving producers the means to reap the
reputational rewards of high quality and giving consumers the ability to make
better-informed purchasing decisions). Of course, notwithstanding the general
dominance of Chicago School theory, other theories of trademark law are extant—including Professor Beebe’s semiotic account and more overt propertybased accounts grounded in deontologically inspired theories of misappropriation. See generally Beebe, Semiotic Analysis, supra (arguing that economic
analyses of trademark law are necessarily incomplete without an accompanying semiotic analysis); Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the
Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547 (2006) (describing
the historical development of misappropriation-based theories of trademark
rights).
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47

diversion of trade. Should the chain of events described above
occur, consumers might rely on inaccurate information in making purchasing decisions, and honest producers of quality goods
may lose sales as a result—both injuries trademark law rightly
seeks to prevent. It is thus little surprise that the commentators who speak favorably of post-sale confusion typically de48
scribe it in terms of bystander confusion. However, as these
same commentators often note, courts can be sloppy in their
analysis of a bystander-confusion claim, extending liability to
conduct that does not threaten to injure either consumers or
49
producers.
The typical path to such expansion of liability is the presumption that the entire parade of events described above will
follow whenever the first of them occurs. The fact that some potential future purchaser of the plaintiff’s product could observe
a purchaser of the defendant’s product, could misidentify the
plaintiff as the source of that product, and could form inferences about the plaintiff’s goods is supposed by some courts to
50
establish that actionable confusion is likely. As Professor Rob47. See generally McKenna, supra note 36 (describing the relationship between traditional trade-diversion and modern trademark doctrines).
48. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 46, at 607–08 (“Protecting against post-sale
confusion can serve information transmission policies. If defendant’s product
is inferior to plaintiff ’s, for example, potential customers might be dissuaded
from even trying to buy plaintiff ’s product after seeing defendant’s inferior
product with the plaintiff ’s mark and wrongly believing it to be the plaintiff ’s.”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile
Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 491 (2005) (“[E]ven though the
buyer is not confused, others might be. . . . This in turn can cause harm—if
people see Rolexes that don’t tell time well, or break, they may mistakenly attribute the shoddy quality of the counterfeit goods to the trademark owner.”);
Anne M. McCarthy, Note, The Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine: Why the General
Public Should Be Included in the Likelihood of Confusion Inquiry, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 3337, 3356–58 (1999).
49. Bone, supra note 46, at 608 (“In some of the broadest post-sale confusion decisions, however, there is no genuine risk that defendant’s product will
be perceived as inferior. In these cases, liability is difficult to square with the
information transmission function of the mark, and goodwill appropriation often plays a prominent justificatory role.”); cf. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 48
(“It is important not to assume that any use of a logo will inevitably confuse
viewers after the sale, however.”).
50. See, e.g., Payless, 998 F.2d at 989 (“Reebok contended that such confusion occurs, for example, when a consumer observes someone wearing a pair of
Payless accused shoes and believes that the shoes are Reebok’s. As a consequence, the consumer may attribute any perceived inferior quality of Payless
shoes to Reebok, thus damaging Reebok’s reputation and image. . . . We agree
with Reebok that the district court abused its discretion in failing to adequately consider the extent of such post-sale confusion.”); Lois Sportswear U.S.A.,
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ert Denicola notes, “the essentially predictive nature of the likelihood of confusion standard permits the accommodation of interests attributable to a host of divergent social and economic
51
prejudices.” Insofar as this is true even of traditional point-ofsale confusion analysis, the chain of inferences required to find
bystander confusion only compounds the problem.
The danger of piling on layers of unsupported inference in
bystander-confusion cases is particularly acute given that
courts have made little effort to distinguish the factual predicates of a likelihood of post-sale confusion from those of a like52
lihood of point-of-sale confusion. Thus, bystander-confusion
theories are frequently found shoehorned into the analysis of a
single factor in the multifactor likelihood-of-confusion balanc-

Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872–73 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[P]ost-sale
confusion would involve consumers seeing appellant’s jeans outside of the retail store, perhaps being worn by a passer-by. The confusion the Act seeks to
prevent in this context is that a consumer seeing the familiar stitching pattern
will associate the jeans with appellee and that association will influence his
buying decisions.”); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 822
(9th Cir. 1980) (“Wrangler’s use of its projecting label is likely to cause confusion among prospective purchasers who carry even an imperfect recollection of
Strauss’s mark and who observe Wrangler’s projecting label after the point of
sale.”); Cartier v. Aaron Faber Inc., 396 F. Supp. 2d 356, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(“Individuals viewing the watches on a purchaser’s wrist would be misled as to
the true nature of the watch’s craftsmanship, and any effect such identification might have on Cartier’s goodwill with the public is actionable.”); CarFreshener Corp. v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 145, 153 (N.D.N.Y.
2004); see also Lunney, supra note 21, at 407 (“This type of confusion comes
very near the focus of deception-based trademark because it concerns incorrect
information that may influence consumer-buying decisions. But courts have
typically offered only the barest possibility of such confusion, and it is difficult
to believe that such confusion would actually prove very widespread, particularly as consumers became aware of the need to separate more precisely imitators from the original. The proffering of this rationale seems, therefore, little
more than a rote recital, intended to raise the specter of possible confusion and
to create some tenuous link to trademark’s deception-based foundations.”).
51. Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982
WIS. L. REV. 158, 162 n.18 (emphasis added).
52. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Keystone Auto. Indus., Inc., 453 F.3d
351, 356–58 (6th Cir. 2006) (“To assess the likelihood of downstream confusion, we first apply the eight-factor test [used to determine point-of-sale confusion] and then discuss the potential harm from the influx of Tong Yang’s
grilles into the stream of commerce. . . although the eight-factor test is arguably less important in assessing downstream confusion than point-of-sale confusion.”); Lois Sportswear, 799 F.2d at 873 (“The Polaroid factors therefore
must be applied with an eye toward post-sale confusion . . . .” (citing Polaroid
Corp. v. Polorad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 493 (2d Cir. 1961))).
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ing analysis applicable to point-of-sale confusion claims, or
54
tacked on to the end of such analysis. In neither case, however, do the courts in question discuss any facts beyond those already reviewed in the point-of-sale confusion analysis that
might be probative of the likelihood of the latter links in the
55
causal chain of the bystander confusion injury. In short, current doctrine encourages courts to speculate about the ripples
that might spread through the stream of commerce and, ultimately, through society, from an admittedly non-confused
purchase.
Some courts, to their credit, appear to be attuned to this
danger. The Seventh Circuit has found such causal speculation
by a district court to be reversible error, albeit on particularly
56
compelling facts. Similarly, the Third Circuit has affirmed the
denial of injunctive relief on the basis of an uncontested district
court finding that the accused goods were not of observably
57
lower quality than the plaintiff’s authentic products. But
counterexamples abound. To take one colorful example, in
Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, the court admitted that it
“can only speculate as to the forms such cheapening or dilution
53. Often the factor in question is related to consumer sophistication, and
the analysis amounts to little more than an excuse for refusing to hold this
factor in the defendant’s favor despite the admitted sophistication of the actual and potential purchasers of the plaintiff ’s products. See, e.g., Acxiom Corp.
v. Axiom, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 478, 497 (D. Del. 1998) (“The ‘sophisticated purchaser’ rationale generally weighs against the likelihood of confusion. Courts,
however, may consider pre-sale and post-sale confusion when evaluating [consumer sophistication].”); Omega, S.A. v. S & N Jewelry Inc., No. 92 Civ. 3656
(PKL), 1992 WL 142746, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1992).
54. E.g., Gen. Motors Corp., 453 F.3d at 356.
55. See, e.g., supra notes 50–54.
56. Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996)
(“The proper examination is not whether some people viewing clamshells in
industry plants might be confused, but rather whether consumers in the market for clamshells are likely to be confused. . . . Although the district court
found that plant tours were given to ‘potential customers’ from foreign countries, there is no evidence in the record that anyone other than the twelve domestic companies has ever purchased, or even expressed an intention to purchase, a clamshell. A determination that the market for clamshells includes
these foreign visitors would be complete speculation.”); see also Perini Corp. v.
Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 128 (4th Cir. 1990) (reversing grant of
summary judgment to the plaintiff and stating that “[i]n order for a likelihood
of confusion among the public, but not typical purchasers [of the parties’ construction services], to provide the basis for a trade name infringement action,
it must be shown that public confusion will adversely affect the plaintiff ’s ability to control his reputation among its laborers, lenders, investors, or other
group with whom the plaintiff interacts”).
57. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 234 –35 (3d Cir. 2003).
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[of the Rolex brand] might take and the injuries that might ensue,” but imposed liability based precisely on such speculation,
including the possibility that security guards at an airport
might be “confused” should a counterfeit gold watch set off a
58
metal detector. Similarly, in In re Artic Electronics Co., the
Trademark Trials and Appeal Board denied a trademark registration on the theory that the registration opponent’s coin and
bill change machines could hypothetically malfunction at an
arcade, causing children to doubt the “workmanship” of the applicant’s video games bearing the same mark and therefore re59
fuse to play them. In other cases, a chain of events culminat60
ing in a trademark injury appears to be assumed sub silentio.
In short, the current state of bystander-confusion doctrine
is exactly backward. The conclusion that a trademark owner is
injured by non-confused purchases of a similarly marked, configured, or packaged product is often assumed by courts speculating about the causal chain of bystander confusion, rather
than proven by trademark infringement plaintiffs. Only where
a defendant can point to particularly compelling facts, such as
the idiosyncratic composition and sophistication of the plaintiff’s consumer base, or the comparatively close quality of the
parties’ goods, will courts entertain the possibility that the
61
causal chain might fail to materialize. The cumulative effect
of judges’ filling a doctrinal vacuum with their own speculation
and departing from that speculation only upon a persuasive
showing from the defendant, is tantamount to shifting the burden of proof on likelihood of confusion—the most important element in a trademark infringement plaintiff ’s case-in-chief—to
58. 645 F. Supp. 484, 493 n.3, 495 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
59. 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 836, 837–38 (T.T.A.B. 1983). That the applicant
still desired the registration despite the fact that it, rather than the registration opponent, would be the party injured by this hypothesized confusion did
not seem to enter into the board’s analysis.
60. Typically the analysis begins and ends with an observation that an
observer might be unable to distinguish between the parties’ marks in the
post-sale context; what the results of this might be, and how those results
might injure the plaintiff is typically left unstated—as is the factual basis for
believing those results are likely to occur. See, e.g., supra note 50. Cases using
such underdeveloped post-sale confusion theories in service of a merchandising right are also typical, though the literature on the merchandising right has
addressed this issue thoroughly. See, e.g., Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2006) (granting
summary judgment to automobile manufacturers in a suit against a retailer
who sold car accessories adorned with manufacturers’ logos). See generally
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 48.
61. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
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the defendant. No lesser authority than the Supreme Court has
recently, specifically, and unanimously warned against precisely
62
this form of burden-shifting in trademark infringement cases.
These infirmities of bystander-confusion doctrine are certainly remediable. The most obvious solution is to take those
facts that courts have cited in rejecting a bystander-confusion
claim and put the burden of establishing contradictory facts on
the plaintiff. Thus, rather than using the hypothetical possibility of post-sale confusion as a reason to ignore the sophistica63
tion of the plaintiff’s customers, a court might put the burden
on the bystander confusion plaintiff to prove that its actual or
potential customers are likely to be in a position to observe the
defendant’s goods in use by others, and moreover that they are
the type of consumers whose purchasing behaviors are likely to
be influenced by such observations (as opposed to, for example,
64
advertising, point-of-sale inspection, or third-party reviews).
Similarly, a bystander-confusion plaintiff might be subjected to
the burden of establishing that any quality difference between
the parties’ products would be detectable to a potential customer of the plaintiff who observes the defendant’s product in use
by others, and that the types of consumers who would be capable of detecting such a difference under those circumstances
would also be the type who would be likely to attribute such dif65
ferences to the plaintiff. Importantly, these doctrinal innova62. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S.
111, 117–21 (2004).
63. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 56 and accompanying text; cf. Hermès Int’l v. Lederer
de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 212, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“While
Hermès’s potential high-end customers may be confused in the post-sale context, these highly sophisticated purchasers will not be confused at the point of
sale.”), aff ’d in part on other grounds, rev’d in part, 219 F.3d 104 (2d Cir.
2000).
65. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Importantly, combining
these two criteria recognizes that there are differing classes of consumers that
might draw different conclusions from seeing the same product in use, particularly in the markets for luxury goods that are so often the subject of post-sale
confusion claims. See Jonah Berger & Morgan Ward, Subtle Signals of Inconspicuous Consumption, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 555, 562–63 (2010) (demonstrating that luxury goods often use “subtle signals” to indicate quality to a narrow
band of consumers); Young Jee Han et al., First Impressions: Status Signaling
Using Brand Prominence 28–32 (USC Marshall Sch. of Bus., Working Paper
MKT 15-09, Apr. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1262479 ( proposing a classification system for different levels of consumer brand signaling
sophistication). It is also consistent with some cases that declined to impose
post-sale confusion liability. See, e.g., Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith
Guitars, 423 F.3d 539, 552–53 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Gibson argues that . . . [o]n a
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tions do not necessarily require any dramatic change in courts’
analysis of trademark infringement claims; they merely require
courts to be faithful to their own commands to apply the likelihood-of-confusion factors (such as consumer sophistication or
product quality) with sensitivity to the particular type of confu66
sion-based injury asserted by the plaintiff.
B. DOWNSTREAM CONFUSION
A second species of post-sale confusion is grounded on the
theory that a defendant’s (admittedly non-confused) customers
might gift or resell the defendant’s goods in a secondary market
in a way that will confuse purchasers or recipients of the goods
in that secondary market. In some such cases, the defendant is
67
selling admitted replicas of the plaintiff ’s goods; in others, the
defendant has acquired the genuine article and modified it in
68
some way. In either case, the injury on which liability is
grounded is not directly inflicted by the defendant (who sells to
a non-confused purchaser), but is rather presumed to be inflicted further down the stream of commerce by one of the defendant’s customers. I will refer to this theory of injury as “downstream confusion.” What is surprising about the downstreamconfusion cases is not that they consider confusing sales or gratuitous transfers in a secondary market harmful to the trademark owner and to the public—that much is uncontroversial.
distant stage, a smoky bar, wannabe musicians [might think a Paul Reed
Smith guitar in the hands of a famous musician is actually a Gibson]. . . . As
Gibson concedes that PRS produces high-quality guitars, we do not believe
such an occurrence could result in confusion harmful to Gibson. If a budding
musician sees an individual he or she admires playing a PRS guitar, but believes it to be a Gibson guitar, the logical result would be that the budding
musician would go out and purchase a Gibson guitar. Gibson is helped, rather
than harmed, by any such confusion.” (citations omitted)). Indeed, this point
has been conceded even by some courts that do impose post-sale confusion liability. See, e.g., Hermès Int’l, 219 F.3d at 109 (“In fact, high-end consumers
may be less confused than the general public in the post-sale context because
many of them will be aware of the existence of copies.”).
66. See, e.g., supra note 52 and accompanying text.
67. A.T. Cross Co. v. Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc., 470 F.2d 689, 692 (2d
Cir. 1972) (“The last straw was the recent mailing, as bold an attempt at persuading purchasers that their donees would think they were receiving Cross
pens as could be imagined.”).
68. Cartier v. Aaron Faber Inc., 396 F. Supp. 2d 356, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Montblanc-Simplo GMBH v. Staples, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 231, 233, vacated,
175 F. Supp. 2d 95, 95 (D. Mass. 2001); cf. Saks & Co. v. Hill, 843 F. Supp.
620, 623–24 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (speculating that defendant, operator of a thrift
store called “Sacks Thrift Avenue,” might one day resell a garment bearing
plaintiff ’s label, thereby causing post-sale confusion).
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Rather, what is surprising is that these cases give almost no attention to the well-established doctrines that are addressed to
such an injury: contributory infringement liability and the
first-sale doctrine.
In Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., the
Supreme Court limited contributory trademark infringement
liability to those cases where the defendant “intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or . . . continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is
69
engaging in trademark infringement . . . .” Recent applications of this standard reaffirm that generalized knowledge of a
possibility of confusing secondary market sales is insufficient to
70
ground a secondary infringement claim. Whether the defendant’s goods are genuine but modified goods or admitted replicas, treating downstream confusion (that is, confusion of the
customers of the defendant’s customers) as primary rather than
secondary infringement eliminates this intent element of the
plaintiff’s case, lowering its burden merely by rephrasing the
nature of its claim. Given that the Supreme Court itself announced the intent element of contributory infringement
71
claims but has never passed on the legitimacy of post-sale con72
fusion, this expansion of secondary liability seems particularly
inappropriate.
Moreover, with respect to goods that originated with the
plaintiff but are later modified and resold by the defendant
(though not with respect to replicas), the first-sale doctrine
would seem to be directly applicable. Trademark law’s first-sale
doctrine—developed by the Supreme Court in Prestonettes, Inc.
73
74
v. Coty and Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders —holds
that the resale of a genuine trademarked product by its purchaser is not trademark infringement so long as the reseller’s
customers are made aware that any differences in quality be69. 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
70. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“For contributory trademark infringement liability to lie, a service provider
must have more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is
being used to sell counterfeit goods. Some contemporary knowledge of which
particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is necessary.”),
remanded, No. 04 Civ. 4607 (RJS), 2010 WL 3733894 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13,
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).
71. Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 854.
72. Supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
73. 264 U.S. 359 (1924).
74. 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
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tween the original and the resold product are attributable to
75
the reseller and the goods are not so changed from their original state “that it would be a misnomer to call the article by its
76
original name . . . .” This principle has been extensively developed in the Circuit Courts of Appeal in cases involving both
new and used resale goods, whether modified, refurbished, or
77
repackaged. Yet only recently has any of those courts directly
considered the first-sale doctrine’s applicability to a claim of
post-sale confusion arising from a defendant’s sale of modified
goods that were legitimately purchased from the plaintiff.
The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue in its most recent
opinion in the long-running Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v.
78
Volkswagen of America, Inc. litigation. Though the case
sounds in bystander confusion rather than in downstream confusion, it is the best evidence we have on how courts might
manage the interaction of any post-sale confusion claim with a
first-sale defense. Au-Tomotive Gold purchased genuine “badges” consisting of the Volkswagen trademark from Volkswagen
dealers and incorporated the badges into its “marquee license
79
plates”—in some instances after gold-plating them. AuTomotive Gold’s packaging included labels explaining “that the
80
plates were not produced or sponsored by Volkswagen.” The
Ninth Circuit rejected Au-Tomotive Gold’s first-sale defense to
75. Champion Spark Plug, 331 U.S. at 130 (“The result is, of course, that
the second-hand dealer gets some advantage from the trade mark. But under
the rule of Prestonettes . . . that is wholly permissible so long as the manufacturer is not identified with the inferior qualities of the product resulting from
wear and tear or the reconditioning by the dealer. Full disclosure gives the
manufacturer all the protection to which he is entitled.”); Prestonettes, 264
U.S. at 368–69 (“The defendant of course by virtue of its ownership had a right
to compound or change what it bought, to divide either the original or the
modified product, and to sell it so divided. The plaintiff could not prevent or
complain of its stating the nature of the component parts and the source from
which they were derived if it did not use the trade mark in doing so. . . . If the
defendant’s rebottling the plaintiff ’s perfume deteriorates it and the public is
adequately informed who does the rebottling, the public, with or without the
plaintiff ’s assistance, is likely to find it out.”).
76. Champion Spark Plug, 331 U.S. at 129.
77. See, e.g., Zino Davidoff S.A. v. CVS Corp., 571 F.3d 238, 243 (2d Cir.
2009); Nitro Leisure Prods. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1361–65 ( Fed. Cir.
2003); Davidoff & Cie, S.A. v. P.L.D. Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1301–02 (11th
Cir. 2001); Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco Inc., 146 F.3d 1083, 1085–86 (9th Cir.
1998); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 6 (2d Cir.
1996).
78. 603 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2010).
79. Au-Tomotive Gold, 603 F.3d at 1135.
80. Id.
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Volkswagen’s post-sale confusion claim based largely on the
court’s assertion that no other court had yet entertained the de81
fense in such a case. In fact, this was not entirely accurate:
the Au-Tomotive Gold court itself relied heavily on a prior
82
Ninth Circuit case, Rolex Watch, that included a thorough
analysis under Champion Spark Plug, and had grounded liability on its conclusion that the defendant’s refurbishment of
Rolex watches had so changed the watches from their original
state as to “result in [] new product[s],” such that allowing
them to be resold under the Rolex name would “be likely to
cause confusion to subsequent or downstream purchasers, as
83
well as to persons observing the product.”
The Au-Tomotive Gold panel went on to disparage its own
first-sale-doctrine precedent in order to find in Volkswagen’s
84
favor. Just a few paragraphs after citing Enesco Corp. v.
Price/Costco, Inc., which had held that “[t]he critical issue [in
determining whether secondary market resale of a product that
originated with the trademark owner is actionable] is whether
the public is likely to be confused as a result of the lack of quali85
ty control,” the panel asserted that the quality of a modified
resold genuine product is irrelevant in post-sale confusion cases
because “likelihood of confusion, not quality control, is the key86
stone of trademark law.” In short, where post-sale confusion
81. Id. at 1138 (“Auto Gold cannot point to any case in which a court has
held that the ‘first-sale’ doctrine applies when there is a likelihood of postpurchase confusion.”).
82. Id. at 1137–39.
83. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704, 707–10 (9th Cir.
1999). Two recent district court opinions arrived at similar conclusions. Cartier, Inc. v. Aaron Faber Inc., 396 F. Supp. 2d 356, 359–61 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(holding that where genuine steel Cartier watches that had been polished and
bejeweled to resemble more expensive gold Cartier watches, retention of the
Cartier mark deceived rather than informed consumers as to the source of the
product); Cartier, Inc. v. Symbolix, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 354, 360–61 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (same). Two earlier Court of Appeals cases deployed similar reasoning to
arrive at similar results, again in cases involving luxury watches. Rolex Watch
U.S.A., Inc. v. Meece, 158 F.3d 816, 825–26 (5th Cir. 1998); Bulova Watch Co.
v. Allerton Co., 328 F.2d 20, 23–24 (7th Cir. 1964). Each of these cases presents a complex mix of the three varieties of post-sale confusion identified in
this Part. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
84. 603 F.3d at 1139–40.
85. Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco Inc., 146 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1998)
(emphasis added), cited in Au-Tomotive Gold, 603 F.3d at 1136–37.
86. Au-Tomotive Gold, 603 F.3d at 1139 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Gen. Circuit Breakers & Elec. Supply Inc., 106 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 1997)
(emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted)). To be fair, there is some precedent that could be extended to support this argument, but it does not come
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doctrine and the first-sale doctrine collide, the Ninth Circuit
has held that it will enforce the former and ignore the latter.
If the modification and resale of a legitimately purchased,
authentically branded good can give rise to liability under a
post-sale confusion theory without regard to the quality controls maintained by the reseller or the disclosures to the reseller’s retail customers, it is difficult to see what remains of
the first-sale doctrine. Given the long and authoritative pedigree of that doctrine, it once again seems inappropriate to wave
it away simply by reframing apposite factual scenarios as postsale confusion cases. In sum, by circumventing both the firstsale doctrine and the intent element of contributory liability
doctrine, downstream-confusion claims generate the same ill
effects as bystander-confusion claims, to wit: they relieve
trademark plaintiffs of a substantial part of their burden of
proof.
These infirmities of downstream-confusion doctrine, like
those of bystander-confusion, can be remedied doctrinally.
Moreover, courts already possess the tools to accomplish this
task. Specifically, by simply applying their own precedents (and
the binding precedent of Inwood Labs, Prestonettes, and Champion Spark Plug) where such precedents are applicable, courts
could ensure that liability is only imposed against defendants
who are actually likely to create relevant confusion in secondary markets. Significantly, this shift might not change the results of many downstream-confusion cases. For example, the
defendant in A.T. Cross Co. v. Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc.
marketed its pens as suitable for duping donees of the defendant’s customers into thinking they had received genuine Cross
87
pens. Such marketing activities would certainly satisfy the
Inwood Labs standard of “intentionally induc[ing] another to
88
infringe a trademark . . . .” Similarly, in Rolex Watch U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Meece, a wholesaler used unauthorized and inferior
parts to “convert” steel Rolex watches into gold watches which
he then marketed—with full disclosure—to retailers (presumably to be resold to retail customers under the Rolex mark with-

from the Ninth Circuit. In Nitro Leisure Prods. v. Acushnet Co., the Federal
Circuit held that the “quality control” or “material differences” tests for determining whether resale of a product originating with plaintiff is likely to
cause confusion apply only to new, repackaged goods, not to used, refurbished
goods. 341 F.3d 1356, 1362–63 ( Fed. Cir. 2003).
87. 470 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1972).
88. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
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out disclosure). In such a case, faithful application of Champion Spark Plug and its progeny to a well-developed record
should lead the defendant to be held liable. For other cases,
however, a doctrinal shift might well change the outcome. It is
therefore important to consider one final alternative theory of
liability that courts (including the Au-Tomotive Gold court)
raise in post-sale confusion cases.
C. STATUS CONFUSION
Assuming that the Ninth Circuit did not intend to do away
with the first-sale doctrine, its characterization of the motivations of buyers and sellers of branded goods suggests a concern
distinct from both the bystander-confusion and downstreamconfusion theories of injury—a concern over free-riding. The
Au-Tomotive Gold court declared that a reseller who purchases
a branded product from authorized channels “is not purchasing
the trademark. Rather, the [reseller] is purchasing a product
90
that has been trademarked.” The reseller’s customer, on the
other hand, wants the brand itself: “the Rolex name. . . . a true
91
Rolex watch.” Given these motivations, the court surmised,
“[i]f a producer profits from a trademark because of postpurchase confusion about the product’s origin, the producer is,
92
to that degree, a free-rider.” But in setting up this distinction
without ever asking what it is about a branded good that
makes it “true,” or about a profit that makes it “free-rid[ing],”
93
the Ninth Circuit ultimately begged the question.
89. 158 F.3d at 818–20.
90. 603 F.3d at 1138.
91. See id. at 1139.
92. Id. at 1138.
93. Other courts considering similar fact patterns have similarly ducked
the issue. See cases cited supra note 85. At least one such court appeared to be
foreshadowing the Au-Tomotive Gold court in treating the “true” mark itself as
the product at issue. In Cartier, Inc. v. Symbolix, Inc., the court asked whether
the defendant’s modifications to the plaintiff ’s product rendered the continued
application of the plaintiff ’s mark to the product misleading under Champion
Spark Plug. Cartier, Inc. v. Symbolix, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 354, 359–60
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Plaintiffs have produced evidence indicating that Saleh intentionally reconditioned the watches in such a manner as to make the watches appear ‘exactly the same’ as the gold Cartier Tank Française model. In this
sense, the changes defendants made to the watches are not the sort of simple
reconditioning or repairs performed in Champion Spark Plug, but are unauthorized, substantial modifications resulting in ‘new construction[s].’ . . . The
alterations are made with the precise intent to deceive the public (though not
the buyer) that the altered product is actually plaintiffs’ higher-end, white
gold, diamond-encrusted Cartier Tank Française watch.” (citations omitted)).
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Other post-sale confusion cases shed more light on the issue. It is no accident that the Au-Tomotive Gold court invoked
Rolex watches in disposing of the matter before it; the source of
post-sale confusion doctrine lies in such extravagant luxuries,
and in fears of free-riding on the social cachet they represent.
Before post-sale confusion even had a name, it was invoked to
prevent the sale of knockoff luxury goods. The rationale behind
these cases is markedly different from that of other forms of
post-sale confusion. In the first such case, Mastercrafters Clock
& Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches,
Inc., the Second Circuit explained the theory of injury in blunt
terms:
[S]ome customers would buy [the junior user’s] cheaper clock for the
purpose of acquiring the prestige gained by displaying what many visitors at the customers’ homes would regard as a prestigious article.
[The junior user’s] wrong thus consisted of the fact that such a visitor
94
would be likely to assume that the clock was [genuine].

Because it is undisputed that the purchaser of the imitation
good does not think he is purchasing the genuine good, once
again the basis for infringement liability must be confusion
other than point-of-sale purchaser confusion. In Mastercrafters,
such confusion was found not in the marketplace, but in the
home, specifically when the purchaser consumes the good in
95
view of a social audience. This theory of injury, which I will
refer to as “status confusion,” is thus the historic source of what
we know today as post-sale confusion.
Status confusion is the underlying theory in what Professor Barton Beebe has called “a surprisingly persistent line of
96
cases, all involving high-status goods.” These goods range
97
98
99
100
from cigars and watches to handbags and award statues.
94. Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le
Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955).
95. See id.
96. Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 855.
97. Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1650,
1689 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The use of an almost-identical typeface on the band only adds to the possibility that the consumer may acquire the prestige of smoking a Cuban [cigar] without actually purchasing one.”), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2005).
98. Cartier, Inc. v. Symbolix, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 175, 182–83 (S.D.N.Y.
2006); see also Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704, 713 (9th
Cir. 1999) (finding the defendant’s alterations to genuine Rolex watches “so
basic that they result[ed] in different product[s]”).
99. See Hermès Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 109
(2d Cir. 2000).
100. See Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Sci. v. Creative House Promotions,
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The argument of these cases makes clear what the Ninth Circuit was referring to in Au-Tomotive Gold when it discussed a
purchaser’s motivations for wanting a “true” luxury good. Put
simply, these cases presume that purchasers of such goods are
not purchasing a level of product quality associated with the
brand, but are rather purchasing the social status that is accorded to those who possess products bearing the brand.
The confusion, and thus the injury, that arises in statusconfusion cases are different in kind from the injury in other
post-sale confusion cases, or for that matter any other type of
trademark infringement case. In the clearest statement of the
theory, the Second Circuit in Hermès International v. Lederer
de Paris Fifth Avenue, Inc. identified two injuries flowing from
101
status confusion. The first injury is visited not on the owner
of the mark, but on its customers: “[T]he purchaser of an original is harmed by the widespread existence of knockoffs because
the high value of originals, which derives in part from their
102
scarcity, is lessened.” The second injury falls not on the mark
owner, nor even on its customers, but on the public at large: “A
loss [to the public] occurs when a sophisticated buyer purchases
a knockoff and passes it off to the public as the genuine article,
thereby confusing the viewing public and achieving the status
103
of owning the genuine article at a knockoff price.”
A comparison of these injuries with the injuries in other
post-sale confusion cases reveals an important distinction: observers in bystander-confusion cases may form mistaken impressions about the quality of the senior user’s products, and
observers in downstream-confusion cases may form mistaken
impressions about the source of products they might acquire in
secondary markets. In either case, consumers might make purchasing decisions that would make both them and the mark
owner worse-off than either would have been absent the confusion. But the relevant observers in status-confusion cases are
not even argued to be potential purchasers, and do not appear
to be confused about product quality at all. Rather, they are
confused about the consumers of the products, and specifically
about who is entitled to the high social status that the brand is
104
supposed to impart.
Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1455–56 (9th Cir. 1991).
101. 219 F.3d 104.
102. Id. at 108.
103. Id. at 109.
104. While the Hermès court tossed in a point-of-sale confusion theory and
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If the injury in the status-confusion cases is that past purchasers of genuine luxury goods who must now abide a lower
degree of exclusivity, or that unspecified observers who are unable to reliably determine the social status of the purchasers of
certain branded goods, the next obvious question is: who cares?
Or more specifically, why should trademark law care? Either
supposed injury would seem to be irrelevant to the widely accepted economic policies underlying trademark law—to lower
consumer search costs and provide an incentive to the efficient
105
production of quality products. Neither would seem to present
any possibility that a consumer would be duped into buying
something he didn’t want, or that a producer would lose a
106
Some alternative theoretical justification for statussale.
a downstream confusion theory for good measure, the former was flatly inconsistent with the lower court’s finding that consumers were not likely to be confused at the point of sale, and the latter suffered not only from the inherent
doctrinal weakness of downstream confusion arguments generally but also
from a complete absence of evidentiary support given the sophistication of
consumers of luxury goods. Compare id. at 108 (“The creation of confusion in
the post-sale context can be harmful in that if there are too many knockoffs in
the market, sales of the originals may decline because the public is fearful that
what they are purchasing may not be an original. Furthermore, the public
may be deceived in the resale market if it requires expertise to distinguish between an original and a knockoff.”), with Hermès Int’l v. Lederer de Paris
Fifth Ave., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 212, 225–26 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Hermès has offered no proof that defendants deceptively attempted to ‘pass off ’ or ‘palm off ’
their products as genuine Hermès. In all instances in which Hermès’ investigators asked defendants’ salespersons the source of the products, the salespersons never responded ‘Hermès’, but rather openly acknowledged that the
products were Hermès ‘knock-offs’ or copies. . . . While Hermès’s potential
high-end customers may be confused in the post-sale context, these highly sophisticated purchasers will not be confused at the point of sale.”), aff ’d in part,
rev’d in part, 219 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2000).
105. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269–70 (1987). I take up the question
whether status confusion might cause injury to some other interest that
trademark law might serve in Part III.D, infra.
106. See McKenna, supra note 36, at 1858–60 (arguing that trademark protection has traditionally been deployed to guard against diversion or loss of
sales); Renée Ann Richardson Gosline, The Real Value of Fakes: Dynamic
Symbolic Boundaries in Socially Embedded Consumption 18 ( May 2009) (unpublished D.B.A. dissertation, Harvard Business Sch.), available at
http://gradworks.umi.com/3371273.pdf (finding, based on empirical research,
that “counterfeits are primarily not seen as substitutes for the authentic product.”). See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark D. McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010) (arguing that trademark law should return
to a focus on purchasing behavior).
Congress has found that counterfeiting costs the United States $200 billion annually, robbing “millions of dollars in tax revenue and tens of thousands of jobs” from the American economy. Stop Counterfeiting in Manufac-
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confusion liability is called for. The remainder of this Article
will attempt to determine what that justification is, and whether it is satisfactory.
II. VEBLEN BRANDS AND INVISIBLE HANDS
In terms of the economic policies that underlie so much of
our thinking about trademark law, there is a logic to the status
confusion cases, but it is a perverse one. To understand this
logic, we must ask what it means for a status good to be of high
quality, as a prelude to understanding how a trademark can
convey information about that quality to consumers. The economic literature on status goods is perhaps not as welldeveloped as it is on other topics of interest to trademark
107
scholars (such as the literature on advertising), but it has a
long pedigree, dating at least to Thorstein Veblen’s classic
108
work, The Theory of the Leisure Class, published in 1899.
This literature suggests that the “quality” of status goods is
fundamentally different from the “quality” of goods with which
trademark law has traditionally concerned itself.
A. CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION
As discussed above, the status-confusion cases all rest on
the premise that purchasers of knockoff luxury goods act with a
particular purpose: they purchase the knockoffs to display
tured Goods Act, Pub. L. No. 109-181, 120 Stat. 285, 285 (2006). This is, to put
it mildly, a dubious claim. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-423
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS 13–14 (2010) [hereinafter ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT] (“Most experts we spoke with
and the literature we reviewed observed that despite significant efforts, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the net effect of counterfeiting and piracy on the economy as a whole.”); see also David S. Wall & Joanna Large, Jailhouse Frocks: Locating the Public Interest in Policing Counterfeit Luxury Fashion Goods, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1094, 1094 –98 (2010); Felix Salmon, All
Counterfeiting Statistics Are Bullshit, FELIX SALMON (June 9, 2005), http://
www.felixsalmon.com/2005/06/all-counterfeiting-statistics-are-bullshit/
(questioning the accuracy of statistics of counterfeit goods).
107. For a recent survey of the voluminous literature on the economics of
advertising, see Kyle Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, in 3
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1701 ( Mark Armstrong & Robert
H. Porter eds., 2007).
108. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1973) (1899). For a summary and synthesis of Veblen’s predecessors and successors in the economic theory of conspicuous consumption, see
generally ROGER MASON, THE ECONOMICS OF CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION:
THEORY AND THOUGHT SINCE 1700 (1998).
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them to others in the hopes that observers will accord them the
status or prestige that attaches to the genuine luxury good.
Veblen explored this impulse over a century ago, coining the
109
term “conspicuous consumption” to describe it. Veblen argued
that the possession of accumulated material wealth—the trophies of success in various stages of social organization—
110
confers superior social standing. Because relatively high so111
cial standing is something we all want, and because relative
112
social standing exists only in comparison with others, socie109. VEBLEN, supra note 108, at 68–101.
110. Id. at 29–30 (“[M]an is an agent. He is, in his own apprehension, a
center of unfolding impulsive activity—‘teleological’ activity. He is an agent
seeking in every act the accomplishment of some concrete, objective, impersonal end. By force of his being such an agent he is possessed of a taste for effective work, and a distaste for futile effort. He has a sense of the merit of serviceability or efficiency and of the demerit of futility, waste, or incapacity. This
aptitude or propensity may be called the instinct of workmanship. Wherever
the circumstances or traditions of life lead to an habitual comparison of one
person with another in point of efficiency, the instinct of workmanship works
out in an emulative or invidious comparison of persons. . . . In any community
where such an invidious comparison of persons is habitually made, visible success becomes an end sought for its own utility as a basis of esteem. Esteem is
gained and dispraise is avoided by putting one’s efficiency in evidence.”); id. at
35 (“[ I ]t is only when taken in a sense far removed from its naïve meaning
that consumption of goods can be said to afford the incentive from which accumulation invariably proceeds. The motive that lies at the root of ownership
is emulation . . . . The possession of wealth confers honor; it is an invidious
distinction.”); id. at 36–37 (“[P]ossessions then come to be valued not so much
as evidence of successful foray, but rather as evidence of the prepotence of the
possessor of these goods over other individuals within the community. The invidious comparison now becomes primarily a comparison of the owner with the
other members of the group. . . . [P]roperty now becomes the most easily recognized evidence of a reputable degree of success . . . . It therefore becomes the
conventional basis of esteem. Its possession in some amount becomes necessary in order to have any reputable standing in the community. . . . The possession of wealth, which was at the outset valued simply as an evidence of efficiency, becomes, in popular apprehension, itself a meritorious act. Wealth is
now itself intrinsically honorable and confers honor on its possessor.”).
111. See id. at 38 (“Those members of the community who fall short of this,
somewhat indefinite, normal degree of prowess or of property suffer in the esteem of their fellowmen; and consequently they suffer also in their own esteem, since the usual basis of self-respect is the respect accorded by one’s
neighbors. Only individuals with an aberrant temperament can in the long
run retain their self-esteem in the face of the disesteem of their fellows. . . . In
any community where goods are held in severalty it is necessary, in order to
ensure his own peace of mind, that an individual should possess as large a
portion of goods as others with whom he is accustomed to class himself; and it
is extremely gratifying to possess something more than others.”).
112. Id. at 39 (“[T]he end sought by accumulation is to rank high in comparison with the rest of the community in point of pecuniary strength. So long
as the comparison is distinctly unfavorable to himself, the normal, average in-
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ties lock themselves into a perpetual and ultimately futile
struggle in which individuals compete to exceed one another in
wealth: “no general increase of the community’s wealth can
make any approach to satiating this need, the ground of which
is the desire of everyone to excel everyone else in the accumula113
tion of goods.”
Much of The Theory of the Leisure Class is occupied with
documenting the various modes of this social competition that
prevailed in Veblen’s day. While many if not all of these exam114
ples can still be found in American society a century later,
perhaps the most generalizable and lasting example has been
the impulse to engage in the conspicuous consumption of goods.
Modern economists have developed Veblen’s insight into formal
models under which the price or scarcity of a good is, in and of
115
itself, an element of its utility. Under these models, demand
for a particular good can increase as the price or scarcity of the
dividual will live in chronic dissatisfaction with his present lot; and when he
has reached what may be called the normal pecuniary standard of the community, or of his class in the community, this chronic dissatisfaction will give
place to a restless straining to place a wider and ever-widening pecuniary interval between himself and this average standard. The invidious comparison
can never become so favorable to the individual making it that he would not
gladly rate himself still higher relatively to his competitors in the struggle for
pecuniary reputability.”).
113. Id. at 39.
114. Compare, e.g., id. at 86–87 (“The low birthrate of the classes upon
whom the requirements of reputable expenditure fall with great urgency is
likewise traceable to the exigencies of a standard of living based on conspicuous waste. The conspicuous consumption, and the consequent increased expense, required in the reputable maintenance of a child is very considerable
and acts as a powerful deterrent.”), with Tina Fey, Confessions of a Juggler,
NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2011, at 64, 64 (“All over Manhattan, large families have become a status symbol. Four beautiful children named after kings
and pieces of fruit are a way of saying, ‘I can afford a four-bedroom apartment
and a hundred and fifty thousand dollars in elementary-school tuition fees
each year. How you livin’?’”).
115. See, e.g., H. Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the
Theory of Consumers’ Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183, 199–205 (1950) (“The essential economic characteristic with which we are concerned is the fact that
the utility derived from a unit of a commodity employed for purposes of conspicuous consumption depends not only on the inherent qualities of that unit,
but also on the price paid for it.”); see also Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Counterfeit Goods, 29 J.L. & ECON. 211, 211–26 (1986) (applying
Leibenstein’s model to the counterfeiting phenomenon); Laurie Simon Bagwell
& B. Douglas Bernheim, Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 349 (1996) (examining factors that cause luxury
brands to sell at higher prices than budget brands, even when the brands are
functionally equivalent). For an overview of economists’ efforts to understand
conspicuous consumption, see generally MASON, supra note 108.
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good increases, precisely because conspicuously costly or rare
goods serve as “signals” of social status. In honor of Veblen’s in116
sights, economists refer to such goods as “Veblen goods.”
Markets for Veblen goods are peculiar insofar as the social signal of expense or scarcity itself, rather than the physical good
in which that signal is manifested, becomes the object of ex117
change.
Professor Jeffrey Harrison clearly summarizes these models in his recent exploration of the relationship of trademark
118
law to status goods, while Professor Barton Beebe extends
the analysis to non-hierarchical consumption-based social differentiation in his recent discussion of what he describes as the
119
“sumptuary turn” in intellectual property law. This Article
will not duplicate their work, but rather seeks to build on it by
focusing in on narrower questions specifically presented by the
status-confusion cases. Thus, where Professor Harrison frames
the ultimate policy question posed by the status-confusion cases as determining whether status signals have the characteris120
tics of a “public good,” this Article will explore the definitional questions that precede such a determination and the policy
questions that follow from it. Insofar as they bear directly on
the relationship between the legal regulation of statussignaling marks and the legal regulation of expression, these
questions have significance that Professor Harrison’s economic
analysis elides completely and Professor Beebe’s sweeping so121
cial critique touches only in passing.
Such questions may seem so obvious that they often go unasked, but they are essential to understanding the role being
played by trademark law in the status-confusion cases. The
first question that must be asked is: what does it mean to “signal” status? And the second is: why do we resort to consumption to send such a signal?
116. See generally, e.g., B. Curtis Eaton & Mukesh Eswaran, Well-Being
and Affluence in the Presence of a Veblen Good, 119 ECON. J. 1088 (2009).
117. See generally Shahar Dillbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational
Basis for Protecting “Irrational Beliefs,” 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605 (2007).
118. See Harrison, supra note 22, at 204 –09. For a related summary offered as background to analysis of status-good manufacturers’ incentives to
police counterfeiting, see Barnett, supra note 22, at 1386–92.
119. See Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 816–30.
120. See Harrison, supra note 22, at 210–19. Professor Harrison then
moves on to examine whether there might be a moral rights argument for using trademark law to prevent unauthorized copying of status signals, see id. at
220–26, an argument I take up below. See infra Part III.C.1.
121. See Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 821, 883–84.
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B. SIGNALS AND THE LEMONS PROBLEM
Veblen posited that the key to relative social status is not
just acquiring wealth; it is being known by others as having
122
relatively high wealth. Wealth is of little social use unless it
can be signaled to others: the fact that one has a large amount
of wealth must in some way be communicated to and under123
stood by one’s social audience. It is logical to ask, then, why
those who desire high status don’t use more direct and convenient modes of information transfer and simply tell their social
relations that they’re wealthy. They might make a habit of introducing themselves by name, annual income, and net worth;
or by printing the same information on business cards; or silkscreening it onto articles of clothing; or by publishing it in a
newspaper; or distributing it on flyers. In other words, they
could engage in explicit speech to acquire the social status that
attaches to wealth, and at a far lower cost than through conspicuous consumption of expensive or rare goods. This raises
the question: why is overt speech not the universal tool for signaling, and thereby acquiring, social status?
Part of the reason may be that social norms suppress such
124
expression. Normative social commitments (e.g., democratic
solidarity, egalitarianism, populism) may discourage expres125
The undesirable consesions of wealth-based difference.
quences of rivalry and envy may deter calling attention to ine126
quality in any direct way. Perhaps for these reasons, it has
long been considered bad manners, or worse, bad citizenship to
talk about or otherwise overtly draw attention to one’s
127
128
wealth, though these mores may be changing. Still, there is
122. VEBLEN, supra note 108, at 42.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Bagwell & Bernheim, supra note 115, at 367 (“Obviously
there are other important considerations that influence the choice of a signal;
completely transparent exhibitions of wealth seem socially unacceptable.”).
125. See id.
126. See, e.g., David Card et al., Inequality at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction, 102 AM. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~moretti/ucpay.pdf (reporting an study finding that
knowledge that one’s income is less than average inflicts psychological harm,
while knowledge that one’s income is above average does not provide a psychological benefit).
127. EMILY POST, ETIQUETTE: IN SOCIETY, IN BUSINESS, IN POLITICS AND
AT HOME 506 (9th ed. 1923) (“A very well-bred man intensely dislikes the
mention of money, and never speaks of it (out of business hours) if he can
avoid it.”); Daniel Gross, Skip the Yacht Race, SLATE (June 22, 2010),
http://www.slate.com/id/2257823/ ( proposing the first of three rules governing
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a more compelling argument for the prevalence of consumption
over speech as a means of signaling wealth-based status. Moreover, this argument shares strong affinities with the economic
model that justifies trademark law.
The primary barrier to using speech as a signal of wealthbased status is likely the fact that anyone can say he is
wealthy. Speech is essentially costless. And if Veblen is correct
that the desire for wealth-based status is universal and unquenchable, we should expect people to make overt claims of
wealth constantly, even if they lack significant wealth. However, it is likely to be very difficult (that is, costly) for the hearers
of explicit claims of wealth to determine whether such claims
are true, even if they were motivated enough to try. Because
explicitly claiming to have superior wealth is easy and costless
despite high demand, but verifying such claims is costly, a
claim of wealth cannot be credibly made through ordinary verbal expression. Inevitably, using speech to signal social status
129
causes a kind of market failure.
This type of market failure should be familiar to trademark
scholars: it is known in the economics literature as a “lemons
130
problem.” In his classic paper, Professor George Akerlof explained that in markets where information about products is
asymmetrical—that is, where sellers know more about product
quality than buyers can reasonably be expected to find out—the
fear of being cheated causes buyers to demand risk discounts,
potentially below prices that sellers of quality goods are willing
131
to accept. Akerlof illustrated the point with a discussion of
the used-car market. He reasoned that the risk discounts demanded by buyers would ultimately drive sellers of quality cars
out of the market, which would become flooded with “lemons,”
the only cars sellers are willing to sell at the price buyers are
132
willing to pay. The spiraling decline in product quality in
CEOs’ conspicuous consumption: “Avoid any activity generally linked with European aristocracy”).
128. See Alex Williams, Not-So-Personal Finance, N.Y. TIMES (SUNDAY
STYLES) Apr. 27, 2008, at 1.
129. Cf. Barnett, supra note 22, at 1388–90 (noting the “negative consumption externalit[ies]” due to “additional perceived users outside the elite consumer class”); Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 826–28 (noting the
“congestion externalities” that frustrate the cultivation of consumption-based
social distinction).
130. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons:” Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–92 (1970).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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turn would ultimately drive buyers out of the market, with the
133
result that no goods can trade. The lemons problem is a particular form of market failure that can be avoided by mitigating
the information asymmetry that causes it. One of the ways of
doing so is by using a trademark in iterated commercial en134
counters to serve as indicia of a reputation for quality. By reliably exposing producers to future losses if they attempt to deceive buyers regarding product quality, trademarks can
prevent the lemons problem and encourage the production of
high-quality goods.
Returning to the “conspicuous consumption” phenomenon,
we can see how the logic of Akerlof ’s argument applies to the
market failure that would result from using speech to signal
status. In the “market” for social status, the information
asymmetry at issue is not between sellers and buyers of goods,
but between claimants of social status and the social audience
that decides whether to confer such status. Where such status
is hierarchically determined by relative wealth, for example,
the claimant plays the role of seller, as he generally has superior information to his audience as to whether he has the qualities—in this case, wealth—he claims. Because speech is costless but status is valuable, a false assertion of wealth leaves a
speaker no worse off—even if he is not believed—and, poten135
tially, much better off—if he is. However, because the audience (playing the role of buyer) is aware of the speaker’s incentives and cannot easily verify his claims of superior wealth, the
proliferation of false claims of wealth would cause all claims of
136
wealth to be disbelieved, even if they were true. Just as the
133. Id.
134. See id. at 499–500 (explaining that brand names can “counteract[ ] the
effects of quality uncertainty”).
135. This assertion assumes that there is no social sanction—e.g., excommunication from one’s social group—for such false declarations. Of course, this
assumption may not be sound in all cases, particularly in small communities
or social groups, but on the social scale at which trademark-related conspicuous consumption generally operates, it is likely to be a good approximation.
E.g., Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 884 (“This is most apparent in
the global trademark system, populated as it is by globally famous
‘hypermarks’ that are not so much designations of source as commodified simulations of such designations, simulations that are themselves the focus of
consumption rather than the underlying product, if any, to which they are affixed.”).
136. The question whether this argument applies with equal force to nonhierarchical forms of social distinction, such as those explored in Beebe,
Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, is beyond the scope of this Article. This limitation is of little relevance precisely because the status-confusion cases are
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owner of a high-quality used car cannot get a fair price due to
137
the proliferation of lemons in the used car market, the truly
wealthy individual cannot acquire high social status merely by
verbally asserting his wealth. In sum, verbal signaling of
wealth-based social status is suppressed—in the absence of legal intervention—by social and economic forces.
C. LEMONS IN THE MARKET FOR SOCIAL STATUS
In order to prevent this market failure and circumvent the
suppression of status signals by social and economic forces, attempts to claim wealth-based status must somehow be made
costly to the claimant, just as putting one’s reputation and future business on the line is supposed to make the sale of poorquality goods costly to a trademark owner. Veblen argued that
society’s solution to this problem was conspicuous material
waste. “In order to gain and to hold the esteem of men,” he posited, “it is not sufficient merely to possess wealth or power. The
wealth or power must be put in evidence, for esteem is awarded
138
To this end, Veblen observed what he
only on evidence.”
termed the “leisure class” engaging in conspicuous consumption
of naturally scarce and therefore costly goods: hand-made silver
139
spoons instead of machine-made aluminum ones; precious
140
141
metals and gems; expensive “food, drink, [and] narcotics;”
142
fashionable dress. “Since the consumption of these more excellent goods is an evidence of wealth,” Veblen wrote, “it becomes
honorific; and conversely, the failure to consume in due quantity
143
and quality becomes a mark of inferiority and demerit.”
almost by definition concerned with high-priced, luxury products. Nevertheless, to the extent that social distinction along dimensions other than wealth—
even non-hierarchical dimensions—is too scarce to satisfy the demand for it,
the same dynamic might be expected wherever a seeker of status might attempt to stake a claim through non-scarce speech, and may be reflected in
trademark law. The merchandising cases are one area where such a dynamic
may be in evidence, though there are certainly alternative explanations for
their outcomes. See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An
Analysis of the Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603
(1984) (analyzing policy justifications for merchandising protections); Dogan &
Lemley, supra note 48 (same).
137. See Akerlof, supra note 130, at 489–92.
138. VEBLEN, supra note 108, at 42.
139. Id. at 94–95.
140. Id. at 96.
141. Id. at 61–64.
142. Id. at 118–31.
143. Id. at 64; see also Bagwell & Bernheim, supra note 115, at 366–67
(noting the “money-burning” or “dissipative” nature of signaling through con-
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American judges interpreting the Lanham Act in the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have taken Veblen’s
insight a step further. As discussed above, courts in statusconfusion cases claim that the same status-seeking behavior
Veblen documented with respect to naturally rare and therefore costly goods can extend to goods that are artificially scarce
due to the marketing strategies of a trademark owner. In short,
the common-law evolution of trademark infringement has replaced Veblen goods with “Veblen brands.” Economists have
noted this shift:
Traditionally, the purpose of brand names has been to assure quality.
The buyer of a branded good could rely on the reputation of the manufacturer to guarantee the quality of the good. . . . More recently,
trademarks seem to have taken on an additional function. Many persons purchase branded goods for the purpose of demonstrating to oth144
ers that they are consumers of the particular good.

In the legal academic literature, Professor Shahar Dillbary has
brought this economic observation full circle, arguing that one
of the “products” being sold with a branded good is precisely the
social signal the brand conveys, separate and apart from the
145
good’s physical qualities. And again, Professor Beebe extends
the argument to non-hierarchical forms of social distinction,
arguing that the logical end result of conspicuous consumption
in the modern age of easy copying and rapid innovation is an
146
entropic slide into indistinction.
This substitution of brands for goods explains courts’ concern in the status-confusion cases over the defendants’ customers who “achiev[e] the status of owning the genuine article at a
147
knockoff price” —and indeed, their concern with price in general. Breaking the link between a Veblen brand and the price
paid for it threatens its credibility as a signal of wealth. While
spicuous consumption); Jeremy N. Sheff, Biasing Brands, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
1245, 1282 (2011). On the notion of money-burning signaling in general, see
Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 629–33 (1981); Phillip Nelson,
Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729, 731–34 (1974). See generally
Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael H. Riordan, Advertising as a Signal, 92 J.
POL. ECON. 427 (1984) (developing a mathematical model to describe the quality-signaling function of advertising); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Price and
Advertising Signals of Product Quality, 94 J. POL. ECON. 796 (1986) (same, for
both prices and advertising levels).
144. Higgins & Rubin, supra note 115, at 211 (emphasis added).
145. See Dillbary, supra note 117, at 620–28.
146. See Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 882–84.
147. Hermès Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 109 (2d
Cir. 2000).
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the judges in these cases sometimes refer to product “quali148
ty,” it is clear that the products’ physical qualities or workmanship are not at issue, or there would be no need to resort to
status-confusion theories rather than bystander-confusion or
downstream-confusion theories (or even traditional point-ofsale confusion theories). Rather, the “quality” sought by consumers in the market for status goods is the quality of the message the brand conveys: its ability to communicate social status
to others.
Thus, the information asymmetry that trademarks are
called on to mitigate in the status-confusion cases is not between buyers and sellers of goods bearing Veblen brands—
genuine or counterfeit. Rather, the asymmetry is between purchasers of goods bearing Veblen brands—genuine or counterfeit—and their social audience. The information as to which the
asymmetry exists is not ultimately about the product at all, but
about the social status of the person consuming it. And consequently, the failure that this line of cases guards against is not
in the market for any particular class of goods, but in the market for social status. Put simply, the “lemons” in the statusconfusion cases are not used cars, and they are not really even
clocks or handbags or watches; they are people.
While the metaphor of the lemons problem provides a useful tool for understanding the policy underlying the statusconfusion cases, it raises problems of its own. Specifically, it reveals the underlying nature of conspicuous consumption—of
status signaling in general—as not only social, but expressive
as well. It is precisely the desire to communicate information
about oneself to others that generates the impulse for conspicuous consumption, and it is the asymmetry of information between speaker and audience that prevents this communication
from taking a form we would more easily recognize as speech.
The primary effect of legal enforcement of Veblen brands is
thus to divert the impulse for social expression out of the arena
of costless speech and into a market system. Because the market would fail without a mechanism for rationing status signals, such signals must be rendered scarce somehow. Absent
natural scarcity, legal intervention would appear to be the only
alternative. The courts in status-confusion cases have seized on
this alternative, creating legally enforceable rights to exclude
others from status signals—propertizing them. Trademark
148. See, e.g., id. at 108 (quoting United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d
1347, 1353 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987)).
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law—which has propertized symbols for centuries in the service
of commerce—may appear to be a convenient legal instrument
for this purpose. However, because the social signaling function
of Veblen brands pertains not to the commercial relationships
among buyers and sellers that we traditionally look to trademark law to regulate, but rather to social relationships among
members of a community, the status-confusion cases raise issues of policy and even of constitutionality that are not implicated by any other area of trademark law.
III. THE MARKET FOR SOCIAL EXPRESSION
Signaling status is an expressive act, which means that
courts’ extension of trademark infringement liability under the
Lanham Act to status-confusion may implicate the First
Amendment. But the mere fact that conspicuous consumption
is expressive in nature does not necessarily imply a specific
conclusion with regard to the constitutionality of this area of
trademark law. Rather, it poses a set of questions about the
appropriate role of government in regulating Veblen brands. A
consumer is “saying” something by wearing a Rolex watch or an
Hermès handbag on her arm, just as a high-school student in
Des Moines is saying something by wearing a black band on his
149
arm during the Vietnam War (and, for that matter, just as a
pharmacist is saying something by posting a price list in his
150
shop window). Obviously this does not imply that all these
forms of expression are, or should be, treated equally under the
First Amendment. Nevertheless, First Amendment analysis is
a useful lens for examining the policy implications of statusconfusion doctrine, largely because it demands that justifications for the doctrine be identified and balanced against com151
peting concerns. This Part argues that status-confusion doc149. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cnty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 503
(1969).
150. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 748 (1976).
151. A complete doctrinal analysis of the appropriate categorization of these cases for purposes of determining the appropriate level of First Amendment
scrutiny is beyond the scope of this Article. Readers in search of such a thorough analysis of trademark law generally may wish to refer to Lisa P. Ramsey,
Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381
(2008), and Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 185–86, 216–24 (1998).
To these analyses, which generally conclude that the effect of trademark law
on expression is not content-neutral, I would merely add that, to the extent
that status-confusion doctrine as a whole purports to limit claims of social sta-
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trine runs afoul of the First Amendment, but I recognize that
this constitutional analysis is likely to be controversial. Even if
the reader disagrees with my ultimate conclusion, this Part’s
analysis should suffice to demonstrate that the policy interests
underlying the First Amendment—interests in democratic egalitarianism, in the truth-forcing power of uninhibited debate, in
the dignitary value of uninhibited self-expression and selfdefinition, and in protecting disfavored or controversial political and social points of view from government suppression—are
at stake in status-confusion cases; and that these interests are
not being sufficiently considered by the courts deciding such
cases.
A. THRESHOLD FIRST AMENDMENT QUESTIONS
Before proceeding to the ultimate question whether statusconfusion doctrine withstands First Amendment scrutiny, there
are a number of formal hurdles the matter must clear. Failure
to clear these doctrinal hurdles might lead to the conclusion
that the First Amendment does not even apply to the conduct
at issue in status-confusion cases. This Section considers those
threshold issues, and argues that the First Amendment is indeed applicable.
1. State Action
As a preliminary matter, we must ask whether the conspicuous consumption of Veblen brands is the type of conduct
that even comes under the First Amendment’s protections. The
first barrier to such protection is the state-action requirement—the rule that the First Amendment restrains the actions
152
of the government only, not those of private parties. This is,
in essence, the objection that the Court raised and rejected in

tus to those who make such claims by virtue of relatively superior wealth, the
doctrine is likely not viewpoint-neutral either. Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (“[The government] has no such authority to license
one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”); infra Part III.B.
152. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“It is, of course, a commonplace that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only
against abridgment by government, federal or state. Thus, while statutory or
common law may in some situations extend protection or provide redress
against a private corporation or person who seeks to abridge the free expression of others, no such protection or redress is provided by the Constitution
itself.” (internal citation omitted)).

806

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:769

153

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Although some lower courts
154
have found to the contrary, commentators largely conclude—
in accord with Sullivan—that the enforcement of a judgment in
a trademark action in such a way as to burden expression
155
would satisfy the state-action requirement. This Article will
not dwell on the issue, which has been thoroughly discussed by
those commentators. Assuming the status-confusion cases involve state action, the question remains: does the imposition of
liability in these cases burden expression?
2. Symbolic Expression/Expressive Conduct
Starting with the expressive content of the consumption of
Veblen brands, the Court’s opinion in Texas v. Johnson provides the relevant test:
In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have
asked whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was
present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message
156
would be understood by those who viewed it.’

Based on the nuanced views of social scientists, it is unclear
that conspicuous consumption of Veblen brands passes this
test. From the social critic’s perspective, “the primary objection
to the view that consumption choices are a form of language is
that it improperly assumes ‘the existence of a shared system of
157
Similarly, economists appear to have concluded
symbols.’”
153. 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (“Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of
speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action. . . . The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but,
whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.”).
154. Reddy Commc’ns, Inc. v. Envtl. Action Found., 199 U.S.P.Q. 630, 633–
34 (D.D.C. 1977); Interbank Card Ass’n v. Simms, 431 F. Supp. 131, 133–34
(M.D.N.C. 1977); Empire Home Servs., L.L.C. v. Empire Iron Works, Inc., No.
05-CV-72584, 2007 WL 1218717, at *8 (E.D. Mich. 2007 April 23, 2007).
155. See Denicola, supra note 51, at 190 & n.146; Lemley & Volokh, supra
note 151, at 185–86, 216–24; Ramsey, supra note 151, at 407–09.
156. 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
410–11 (1974)).
157. Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 883 (quoting Colin Campbell, When the Meaning Is Not a Message: A Critique of the Consumption as
Communication Thesis, in BUY THIS BOOK: STUDIES IN ADVERTISING AND
CONSUMPTION 340, 341 ( Mica Nava et al. eds., 1997)). But see Beebe, Semiotic
Analysis, supra note 46, at 703 (“It has long been a cliché, of social theory as
much as of advertising practice, that consumers communicate with each other
by the objects they consume. Of late, however, commodity culture has begun to
unburden itself of the object language of material commodities. The trademark
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that different brands send different social signals depending on
the sender and recipient, the consumer and his or her social ob158
server.
Such ambiguity and nuance are not recognized, however,
by the courts that decide the status-confusion cases, who universally assert that the consumption of both genuine and counterfeit branded goods is intended to and in fact does convey a
159
particular message of social status. Indeed, this proposition is
a necessary step in establishing infringement in the statusconfusion cases. Absent the receipt of a supposedly false social
message by post-sale observers, the injury on which liability
depends simply evaporates—there is no other “confusion” pre160
sented by the facts. As such, the status-confusion cases themselves conclude—or at least assume—that the conspicuous consumption of Veblen brands has “sufficient communicative
elements” to bring the First Amendment into play.
Granted, the status-confusion courts’ reasoning on this
score is almost embarrassingly unsophisticated. The social science literature described above suggests that rather than being
strictly a means to efficiently and effectively assert wealthbased hierarchical social status, conspicuous consumption of
branded goods is part of a subtle and complex process of social
definition, affiliation, and differentiation along countless di161
Were the status-confusion courts to take such
mensions.
system has developed as an alternative language of consumption, and its development has been rapid indeed. No other language in history, and certainly
no other language of distinction, has experienced such explosive growth, both
extensively and intensively, in so short a time. The trademark system’s classificatory scheme now orders culture as much as the market. To be sure, it is not
the only such system to do so, but none exercises its classifying function so exoterically, in terms so easily and widely understood.”).
158. See Berger & Ward, supra note 65, at 565–66; Han et al., supra note
65, at 28–32.
159. See, e.g., Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & ConstantinLe Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955) (“[S]ome customers
would buy plaintiff ’s cheaper clock for the purpose of acquiring the prestige
gained by displaying what many visitors at the customers’ homes would regard as a prestigious article.”); see also supra Part I.C.
160. See, e.g., supra note 104.
161. See Berger & Ward, supra note 66, at 565–66; Jennifer Edson Escalas
& James R. Bettman, You Are What They Eat: The Influence of Reference
Groups on Consumers’ Connections to Brands, 13 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 339,
339 (2003), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/S15327663JCP1303_14
(“When brand associations are used to construct the self or to communicate
the self-concept to others, a connection is formed with the
brand. . . . [A]ssociations about reference groups become associated with
brands those groups are perceived to use, and vice versa. The set of associa-
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complex social phenomena into account, it is possible that coun162
tervailing interests in expressive association might be as
strongly implicated as the interests in expression discussed in
this paper, and that Veblen’s model would lose much of its ap163
peal. Professor Beebe has provided a thorough exploration of
the role of intellectual property law in the construction, perpetuation, and dissolution of these non-hierarchical forms of social
164
distinction, and his analysis is likely more accurate than that
of the courts deciding status-confusion cases in its description
of conspicuous consumption. Nevertheless, status-confusion
doctrine rests on a set of assumed facts about the nature of
consumption, and so long as courts continue to rely on those assumptions in applying trademark liability, it is only proper that
the same facts be subjected to First Amendment analysis.
3. Standing
The fact that consumption of Veblen brands is expressive
does not necessarily mean that regulation of commerce in Veblen brands similarly warrants First Amendment scrutiny. This
tions can then be linked to consumers’ mental representations of self as they
select brands with meanings congruent with an aspect of their current selfconcept or possible self, thus forging a connection between the consumer and
the brand.”); Han, supra note 65, at 28–32.
162. 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 31:145 (“A trademark is itself a powerful symbol identifying a single person, corporation or commercial source. When
it is used without permission as a vehicle for someone else’s controversial message, it will be a matter of fact whether the ordinary viewer is likely to believe
that the owner of the trademark sponsors or approves of the content of the
message. Alternatively, the message itself may be so ‘morally repugnant’ that
the person or company would be forced to speak in rebuttal. When the property right resides in the symbol of a trademark itself, the link between defendant’s message and the trademark owner should be much more likely to occur
than when the property right merely resides in a semi-public shopping center,
as in Pruneyard.” (citing Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74
(1980)). Cf., e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (holding
that requiring the Boy Scouts to admit a gay scoutmaster under a state antidiscrimination law violated the organization’s First Amendment right of expressive association); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 572–73 (1995) (holding St. Patrick’s Day Parade
organizers have a First Amendment right to exclude a gay, lesbian, and bisexual Irish-American organization from their event).
163. Possible, but in my view, unlikely. See generally Jeremy N. Sheff,
Brand Renegades, 1 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1919328 (arguing that extant
trademark doctrine supports the proposition that the consumption of socially
charged brands is protected expression more than it supports an associationbased right of brand owners to suppress such consumption).
164. See generally Beebe, Semiotic Analysis, supra note 46.
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distinction can be understood as a standing argument regarding First Amendment scrutiny of status-confusion claims. The
defendant in status-confusion cases is selling others the means
to express a message of social status but is not expressing such
a message himself. Allowing such a defendant to raise a First
Amendment defense based on injuries to the defendant’s customers might therefore seem to run afoul of the general rule
165
against third-party standing. But of course, this rule has exceptions which are likely applicable to the trademark context
generally and the status-confusion context in particular.
Trademark infringement and unfair competition law allow pro166
ducers to assert the interests of their customers in court, an
example of the principle that a sufficient relationship between
the party asserting the right and the party whose right is being
167
asserted can create an exception to the “rule of self-restraint”
168
against third-party standing.
Moreover, granting standing to a status-confusion plaintiff
but not to a defendant in the same case would create a doublestandard. In traditional point-of-sale confusion cases, of course,
such discrimination might be legitimate. The point-of-sale con165. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“[T]he plaintiff
generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his
claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”). It is notable
that at least one important jurisdiction is considering legislation to criminalize
the purchase of counterfeit trademarked goods, rather than their sale. New
York City Council File No. Int. 0544 -2011 (Apr. 28, 2011), available at http://
legistar.council.nyc.gov (click “Legislation;” then search “2011” for “Int 0544 2011;” then follow “Int 0544 -2011” hyperlink). Presumably the standing analysis regarding such a statute would be more straightforward.
166. Thus, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act gives producers the right to sue
their competitors in order to vindicate their customers’ interests, although this
exception to the rule against vicarious standing has been criticized in the false
advertising context. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006) (giving a private right of
action to “any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged”
by acts that are likely to cause confusion of consumers or that misrepresent
the qualities of goods). See generally Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for
False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law
of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1 (1992) (criticizing the recognition of competitor
standing in false advertising cases).
167. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255–58 (1953) (“There is such a
close relationship between the restrictive covenant here and the sanction of a
state court which would punish respondent for not going forward with her covenant . . . that relaxation of the rule is called for here.”).
168. Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277,
289 n.71 (1984) (“The Court appears quite willing to permit such [third-party
constitutional] challenges simply upon a showing of the existence of certain
relationships between the litigant and the third party right holder, such as
those between vendor and customer, or physician and patient.”).
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fusion plaintiff can assert his own injury in the form of diversion of trade, whereas the defendant who is alleged to have deceived his own customers would seem to be a poor representative of his victims’ interests. In contrast, trademark owners in
status-confusion cases are unlikely to be able to establish any
lost sales, and the customers of defendants in those cases have
169
gotten exactly what they wanted. In short, it seems appropriate to permit status-confusion defendants to raise the First
170
Amendment interests of their customers in litigation.
4. False Statements of Fact
One last possible objection to applying the First Amendment to status-confusion cases is that whatever expression is
burdened by the threat of infringement liability constitutes a
socially valueless false statement of fact. This objection raises
three questions: first, what is the “fact” that conspicuous consumption purports to communicate; second, even if such a “fact”
were false, would the First Amendment not extend it protection; and third, does the answer to the second question depend
at all on the possibility that even a false statement of fact
might have social value?
On the first point, even given the status-confusion courts’
less-than-nuanced understanding of conspicuous consump171
tion, we might infer a range of expressive content from the
act of consuming a counterfeit luxury good. Depending on the
level of generality at which the message is thought to be
pitched, the conspicuous consumer of such a product might be
saying, “I purchased this genuine luxury product from the owner of the trademark affixed to it (or an authorized reseller),” or
“I spent so many dollars on this product,” or “I am the kind of
person who has so many dollars to spend on this kind of product,” or “I am the kind of person who consumes this kind of
product,” or “I am as good a person as (or a better person than)
you.” Importantly, in the status-confusion cases, only the first
two—the most specific—of these statements can be categorical172
ly deemed false, while the language of those cases implies
169. See supra note 106.
170. See Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 60, 89–90 (2008).
171. See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text.
172. Indeed, recent research suggests that purchasers of counterfeit luxury
goods can afford genuine articles but prefer, for various reasons, to purchase
counterfeits (at least initially). DAVENPORT LYONS, COUNTERFEITING LUXURY:
EXPOSING THE MYTHS (June 2007) ( finding that purchasers of counterfeit lux-
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that the last statement—which seems more like a statement of
173
opinion than of fact —is most in line with what purchasers of
174
counterfeit goods are actually trying to express.
On the second point, even these narrowly construed and
therefore literally false statements may not fall outside the protection of the First Amendment. While a mountain of Supreme
Court dicta asserts that false statements of fact have no social
175
or constitutional value, First Amendment scholars consider
ury goods are of a similar demographic profile as purchasers of genuine luxury
goods, and in fact are more likely to purchase a genuine luxury good than is
their demographic group as a whole).
173. Cf. Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc. 227 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir.
2000) (“[N]on-actionable ‘puffery’ comes in at least two possible forms: (1) an
exaggerated, blustering, and boasting statement upon which no reasonable
buyer would be justified in relying; or (2) a general claim of superiority over
comparable products that is so vague that it can be understood as nothing
more than a mere expression of opinion.”). This point also provides an answer
to the argument that misrepresentation of social status could cause a tangible
injury, for example, if a confidence man wore counterfeit luxury goods to engender trust in his victims. I would argue that such a use of a counterfeit
product, while it might be considered expressive, would not be properly considered a false statement of fact. To the contrary, the confidence man hypothetical seems more analogous to the Pizza Hut court’s first definition of puffery, insofar as reliance on luxury consumption as an indicator of
trustworthiness in business transactions could be said to be an unreasonable
basis to enter into such transactions. I am grateful to Professor Rebecca
Tushnet for this point. See Rebecca Tushnet, WIPIP at BU Session 3, REBECCA
TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG ( Feb. 12, 2011, 10:07 AM), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/
2011/02/wipip-at-bu-session-3.html.
Of course, the doctrine of puffery in itself reflects a judgment that an audience ought to be held to a standard of reasonableness, and that they rightly
bear the risk of any loss they suffer by acting in unreasonable reliance on a
statement that is properly characterized as puffery. Whether such an objective
standard of the consumer ought to be incorporated into trademark law, let
alone into post-sale confusion law, is an open question. See Rebecca Tushnet,
Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising
Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1352–73 (2011). See generally Barton Beebe,
Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020 (2005)
(analyzing “trademark law[’s] lack [of ] a well-developed theory of the consumer”); Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Model of Trademark
Law, 98 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
174. See supra Part I.C. In fact, current research suggests that many
knockoff purchasers are expressing a kind of aspirational social claim: they
freely admit to owning a counterfeit product, and perceive it as a way to plan
and test their future social status and consumption behaviors. DAVENPORT
LYONS, supra note 172, at 15 (“We found that fake owners were proud of their
purchases, especially as the quality of fakes is now perceived as on a par with
that of the genuine products.”); see also Gosline, supra note 106.
175. See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1218–19 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Bybee, J., dissenting) (collecting cases), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (Oct.
17, 2011).
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the constitutional status of false statements of fact a vexed
176
question. Of course, regulation of false statements of fact that
cause monetary or reputational harms—defamation and fraud
being the most obvious examples—has long been considered
177
constitutional. It is for this very reason that traditional applications of trademark law—which proscribe certain misleading
forms of commercial expression in order to prevent injury to
mark owners’ goodwill and fraud against confused purchas178
ers—raise no First Amendment issues. But absent such direct injury flowing from the false statement, other concerns—
179
about chilling effects on protected expression, fear of a slippery slope to overbearing government regulation of expres180
sion, or distrust of government in the regulation of “ideologi181
cally inflected” statements —might well lead one to conclude
that the First Amendment has a role to play in keeping the
182
government out of the role of speech referee. Indeed, these
concerns have generated heated judicial and scholarly debate
over the applicability of the First Amendment in another area
176. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination
of Socially Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2–6 (2008); Frederick
Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 912–19
(2010); Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central,
Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1107–
10 (2006); Mark Tushnet, “Telling Me Lies:” The Constitutionality of Regulating False Statements of Fact 7–16, 24 –25 (Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 11-02, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1737930 [hereinafter Tushnet, False Statements of Fact].
177. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S.
557, 563–64 (1980) (“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about
lawful activity. The government may ban forms of communication more likely
to deceive the public than to inform it, or commercial speech related to illegal
activity.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301–02 (1964) (Goldberg,
J., concurring) (“The imposition of liability for private defamation does not
abridge the freedom of public speech or any other freedom protected by the
First Amendment.”); see also Tushnet, False Statements of Fact, supra note
176, at 2 n.5, 14.
178. See Ramsey, supra note 151, at 414 –21.
179. See Tushnet, False Statements of Fact, supra note 176, at 7–10 (citing
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279).
180. See id. at 16–17.
181. See id. at 17–22.
182. Cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the
press, speech, and religion. In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us.”).
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where the government purports to regulate claims of status:
183
prosecutions under the Stolen Valor Act. Given the far narrower focus of that statute, these concerns would seem to apply
184
with far greater force to the “ideologically inflected” use of
Veblen brands to claim social status in a diverse and socially
mobile society.
This brings us to the third question (two related questions,
really): what is the social value of whatever expressive content
inheres in conspicuous consumption of counterfeit Veblen
brands, and does application of the First Amendment depend
on our assessment of that value? Why might we allow a consumer to attempt to deceive her social audience as to her consumption practices? The status-confusion cases suggest that
the harm resulting from such deception is that an observer
might accord wealth-based social status to the purchaser of a
counterfeit luxury product, or withhold it from the purchaser of
185
a genuine one. It is unclear whether this mistaken grant of
status can be understood as a legally cognizable injury on a par
186
with the injuries worked by fraud and defamation. More importantly, even if we were to consider it an injury, we could do
so only from the perspective of one segment of society; to another segment of society, it is a benefit. The deception worked
by status-confusion allows for the possibility that hierarchical
social status—and all that flows from it—might be allocated
based on something other than wealth. This may be bad for the
wealthy, but potentially quite good for everyone else—a very
183. Compare id. with Eugene Volokh, Amicus Curiae Brief: Boundaries of
the First Amendment’s “False Statements of Fact” Exception, 6 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 343 (2010) (finding that, although the exception to First Amendment protection of false statements can be ambiguous, it can still be constitutionally
permissible). The Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, 120 Stat. 3266
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 704( b) (2006)), makes it a federal crime to falsely claim
to have been awarded certain military decorations. As of this writing, the
statute has been ruled unconstitutional by the Ninth Circuit (over strenuous
dissents) and by the District of Colorado, but upheld by the Western District of
Virginia; the Supreme Court will hear a challenge to the statute’s constitutionality this term. See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir.
2010), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 638 F.3d 666, cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W.
3098 (Oct. 17, 2011); United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815 (W.D. Va.
2011); United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Colo. 2010).
184. See Tushnet, False Statements of Fact, supra note 176, at 17–22.
185. See supra notes 101–04.
186. Recent Supreme Court precedent suggests that we should be extremely hesitant to analogize from the fraud and defamation exclusions from First
Amendment protection. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584–86
(2010).
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different scenario from the negative-sum world of economic
187
fraud. The question whether consumption of counterfeit Veblen brands has social value deserving of First Amendment protection thus collapses into a much more fraught question:
whose perspective should be used to judge the social value of
socially expressive conduct? As Judge Kozinski argued in his
recent concurrence in United States v. Alvarez, this is precisely
the type of question—the question of individual and community
self-definition—that the First Amendment takes (or ought to
take) out of the government’s hands:
It doesn’t matter whether we think that such lies are despicable or
cause more harm than good. An important aspect of personal autonomy is the right to shape one’s public and private persona by choosing
when to tell the truth about oneself, when to conceal and when to deceive. Of course, lies are often disbelieved or discovered, and that too
is part of the pull and tug of social intercourse. But it’s critical to
leave such interactions in private hands, so that we can make choices
188
about who we are.

***
In sum, while some might question whether the First
Amendment is implicated by the imposition of trademark infringement liability under status-confusion doctrine, I submit
that the better arguments lead to the conclusion that the
Amendment should apply. But what are the implications of this
conclusion? To answer this question, we must look to the nature of the expressive burdens imposed by post-sale confusion
doctrine, and the potential government interests that might
189
This
justify the doctrine notwithstanding those burdens.
weighing of policy interests is relevant even if one does not
agree with the foregoing conclusion that the First Amendment
applies to the conduct at issue in status-confusion cases. At the
very least, the social interests in allowing such conduct to con187. See Akerlof, supra note 130 (using the lemons problem to explain how
poor quality products and dishonest business dealings hurt honest business).
See generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and
Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967) (modeling the negative social welfare effects of
theft).
188. 638 F.3d 666, 675 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
189. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (“[A] government regulation [that incidentally restricts expressive conduct] is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”).
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tinue ought to be weighed against the interests in stamping it
out.
B. THE BURDEN OF STATUS CONFUSION ON SOCIAL EXPRESSION
The First Amendment concerns raised by the enforcement
of Veblen brands are different in kind from the concerns that
have been raised by trademark scholars in other contexts. One
strain of commentary focuses on the trademark as the subject
matter of speech: the expansion of infringement and dilution
liability, it is argued, gives trademark owners too much control
over what others may say, directly or indirectly, about their
190
marks. A second strain of commentary focuses on trademarks
as lexemes: when symbols take on a set of non-sourceidentifying meanings in popular culture, it is argued that the
public has an interest in accessing and even modifying those
meanings in cultural discourse, irrespective of the interests of
191
the mark owner. In both strains of commentary, the battle
lines over trademark-related speech are drawn between the expressive (and, impliedly, commercial) interests of the mark
owner and the expressive interests of everyone else.
Status confusion, in contrast, enlists mark owners as defenders of the expressive interests of their customers, in opposition to those customers’ social competitors (who in turn are
192
championed by the mark owners’ business competitors). The
chief burden on speech imposed by the protection of Veblen
brands thus arises from this social competition, and particularly the problem of social scarcity. “For all of our technology, we
cannot create a greater overall sum of social distinction. We can
193
only allocate among ourselves the sum that we have.” Accordingly, in order for some people to convey information about
their social status credibly (for example, by consuming Veblen
brands), others must be prevented from doing so.
190. See Denicola, supra note 51, at 158–60; Ramsey, supra note 155, at
386 n.22 (citing sources); see also Laura A. Heymann, The Public’s Domain in
Trademark Law: A First Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV.
651, 688–715 (2009) (analyzing the First Amendment autonomy interests of
consumers as listeners entitled to diverse sources of meaning with respect to
brands).
191. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as
Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 397–99
(1990); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 960–63,
972–77 (1993); cf. Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 1601 (2010).
192. See Grynberg, supra note 170, at 107–09.
193. Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 824.
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This is the fundamental dilemma of social signaling, and
thus of status confusion. Inevitably, someone’s social expression
will be suppressed; the only questions are whose and how. If we
do not enforce Veblen brands, and there is no other way of rationing access to social status, then social forces—norms, and,
more importantly, economic and social incentives—restrain
everyone, rich and poor alike, from expressing their desired
messages. This is the lemons problem discussed in the previous
194
Part. If, however, some naturally scarce resource can be used
as the basis for allocating social status, then market forces—the
high prices that result when demand for social status outstrips
supply of the medium of its allocation—will restrain some (especially poorer) consumers from expressing their desired message. This is the world of conspicuous consumption of naturally
scarce goods documented by Veblen.
But the status-confusion cases reveal a third option. If we
enforce trademark rights in Veblen brands through statusconfusion doctrine, then the power of the State restrains some
(again, poorer) consumers from expressing their desired mes195
sage. The status-confusion cases use the authority of federal
law to suppress the social expression of the have-nots so as to
196
enable the social expression of the haves. By channeling expression relating to social status into a market regime that
rests on government-enforced monopolies (such as the trademark regime), rather than on natural scarcity, the state is taking sides in the competition to define and claim social status by,
197
in essence, subsidizing one side of that competition.
194. See supra Part III.A.
195. See Lunney, supra note 21, at 421–33.
196. This competition engages social allegiances based not only on economic status, but on generational, ethnic, and gender identities as well. Notably,
in the Hermès litigation, a female district judge who had found no public harm
in the sale of copycat handbags to non-confused consumers was overruled by
an appellate panel composed of three men, all older than she. See Hermès Int’l
v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(Scheindlin, J.), rev’d, 219 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2000) (Telesca, J., joined by
Meskill & Cabranes, JJ.). And of course, the counterfeiting debate reveals the
uneasy interconnectedness of the developed and the developing world, with all
the racial and ethnic baggage inherent in that dynamic. See ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT, supra note 106, at 8 (“According to CBP data, seized
counterfeit goods are dominated by products from China. During fiscal years
2004 –2009, China accounted for about 77 percent of the aggregate value of
goods seized in the United States. Hong Kong, India, and Taiwan followed
China, accounting for 7, 2, and 1 percent of the seized value, respectively.”).
197. Notably, the side receiving the subsidy appears to be the side less in
need of it.
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The central claim of this Article is that using the power of
the State in this way runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s declaration in Buckley v. Valeo: “[T]he concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
198
First Amendment.” By regulating who may stake a claim to
social status and who may not—or, more specifically, by deputizing private parties to invoke the coercive power of the law to
do so—status confusion entangles the government in the zerosum, perpetual competition for social status. Moreover, it does
199
so in a particularly burdensome way, by imposing the equivalent of prior restraints against speakers who have not obtained
200
permission to speak, ordering the forfeiture and destruction
201
of property that constitutes the means of expression, and imposing harsh civil and criminal penalties as a deterrent to those
who would provide the means of expression to those seeking
202
unauthorized access to the restricted message. Finally, unlike
other areas where the government may license private parties
to control naturally scarce means of expression and then regulate their exercise of that control to serve the public interest
203
(such as broadcasting spectrum), in the status confusion cases the government regulation itself is creating the scarcity that
204
results in unequal rights of expression. Particularly where
198. 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976).
199. Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What
Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance
Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) [hereinafter Tushnet, Copyright as a Model] (“If the justification were anything
other than copyright, these sweeping powers would be seen as a gaping hole at
the heart of free speech rights.”).
200. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (authorizing ex parte
awards of injunctive relief against trademark counterfeiters); see also Lemley
& Volokh, supra note 155, at 216–24 (discussing the prior restraint doctrine as
it applies to trademark injunctions).
201. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (authorizing ex parte seizure orders against
counterfeit goods); 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (2006) ( providing for destruction of infringing articles).
202. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117( b)–(c) (2006 & Supp. 2010) ( providing for treble
damages and statutory damages for counterfeiting); 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2006 &
Supp. 2010) (establishing criminal liability for trafficking in counterfeit
goods).
203. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375–79 (1969).
204. This unique feature of Veblen brands also distinguishes statusconfusion cases from Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974), insofar as it is the government grant of a property right in the medium
of expression, rather than the capital cost of finding alternative access to that
medium, that causes the restriction on expression. One might argue that dis-
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the expression at issue is part of a debate over the relationship
between wealth and social status, a government licensing regime that has the effect of reinforcing such a relationship also
205
has the effect of deciding the debate in favor of one side. In
sum, the enforcement of Veblen brands uses government power
to maintain a heavy burden on the social expression of already
disadvantaged segments of American society.
C. THE GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN THE MARKET FOR SOCIAL
SPEECH
What policy or interest might justify this selective and un206
equal restraint on expression? Insofar as technology in the
long run can be expected to continue to reduce the cost of copying Veblen brands until it approaches the minimal cost of
207
speech, the primary effect of status-confusion doctrine is to
subject Veblen brands to an artificial condition of scarcity. By
enforcing private rights to exclude others from certain symbolic
expressions of social status, the status-confusion cases
propertize and create a market for such signals. This right to
exclude provides trademark owners with an incentive (in the
208
form of monopoly pricing power) to restrict the supply of Veblen brands, which in turn allows Veblen brands to serve their
signaling function. This Part will consider some possible inter-

appointed consumers (or entrepreneurs seeking to satisfy their demand for
status signals) are as free to launch a competing Veblen brand as Tornillo was
to start his own newspaper. The key distinction is that the barrier to entry
that this expensive alternative represents is imposed not by the market price
of ink or printing presses or distribution networks—status-confusion defendants are not demanding access to their adversaries’ factories or supply
chains—but only by the government’s enforcement of a monopoly on the intangible Veblen brand itself. See infra Part III.C.1.
205. Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV.
1405, 1413 (1986) (“Individuals might be ‘free’ to start a newspaper in a way
that they are not ‘free’ to start a TV station, because in the latter case they
need both capital and government approval, while for the newspaper they
need only capital. But that fact will not close the gap between autonomy and
public debate; it will not guarantee that under autonomy principles the public
will hear all that it must. Licensing may distort the market in some special
way, but even the market dreamt of by economists will leave its imprint on
public debate, not only on issues that directly affect the continued existence of
the market, but on a much wider range of issues (though with such issues it is
often difficult to predict the shape and direction of the skew).”).
206. That is, content-based and viewpoint-discriminatory. See supra note
151.
207. See Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 830–40.
208. See Lunney, supra note 21, at 467–69.
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ests the government might have in creating and maintaining
this market.
1. The Property Thesis: Free-Riding and Misappropriation
209

One argument—raised in the Au-Tomotive Gold case —is
that status confusion liability is necessary to combat freeriding. The status confusion defendant, one might argue, is
reaping where he has not sown, extracting value from a Veblen
brand that properly belongs to the plaintiff. Professor Harrison
explicitly considers (and ultimately rejects) this justification for
post-sale confusion, prompted to the issue by the provocative
210
musings of Judge Kozinski. Harrison identifies this argument
in favor of post-sale confusion with Lockean or “moral rights”
211
theories of property founded on the moral claims of labor,
which is the framework within which I will begin to assess it.
Certainly there is a trend toward property-based theories
of trademark rights in recent years—the dilution statute being
212
the clearest example. But there are still numerous problems
with taking a moral rights approach to status confusion. The
first is that it is unlikely that Lockean theory would support
the rights claimed by status confusion plaintiffs. As others have
argued, overbroad definitions of intellectual property rights violate the “Lockean proviso” that property rights are morally justified only where they leave “enough, and as good” in common
213
for others. Because status-confusion doctrine moves us from a
209. See Au-Tomotive Gold v. Volkswagen of Am., 603 F.3d 1133, 1138–39
(9th Cir. 2010).
210. See Harrison, supra note 22, at 222 & n.104 (“[Judge Kozinski] suggests, as many do, that one can link the exclusive right to intellectual property
to Locke’s more general justification for individual property rights.”).
211. See id. at 220–26 (citing Kozinski, supra note 191, at 966–67).
212. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (“Subject to the principles of equity,
the owner of a famous mark . . . shall be entitled to an injunction . . . regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of
competition, or of actual economic injury.”). See generally Bone, supra note 46,
(exploring the historical development of the misappropriation rationale underlying trademark law’s expansion).
213. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 15 (J.W. Gough
ed., Blackwell 3d ed. 1976) (1690); see Harrison, supra note 22, at 220–26; cf.
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1583–
91, 1605 (1993) (arguing that analogous assertions of trademark rights
against expressive users in the absence of confusion are inconsistent with a
properly reasoned Lockean account of intellectual property); Harrison, supra,
at 225 (finding the exclusivity of intellectual property inconsistent with
Lockean ideals); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private In-
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world in which all are equally able (or equally unable) to express a particular form of social message to one in which some
are excluded from expressing such a message so that others
might do so more effectively, the proviso would seem to be violated.
More importantly, if we view the status-goods cases as reflecting a misappropriation or free-riding theory, we must ask:
what is being misappropriated? On what interest of the plaintiff is the defendant taking a free ride? This is a question that
has been well-examined by trademark scholars in other contexts. While some commentators argue that any value that inheres in a trademark should rightly be considered the mark
214
owner’s property, this argument is a classic example of what
Professor Felix Cohen famously referred to as “the
215
‘thingification’ of property.” Cohen demonstrated the essential circularity of the argument: “It purports to base legal protection upon economic value, when, as a matter of actual fact,
the economic value of a sales device depends upon the extent to
216
which it will be legally protected.”
Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss has argued that this
circular “if value then right” argument poses a direct threat to
expressive uses of trademarks, and must therefore be cab217
ined. Similarly, Professors Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna
have argued that the circularity of the property-based freeriding arguments that have provided momentum for the expansion of trademark rights into markets where the mark owner
does not compete demands that the expansion be “tied to some
tellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF
PROPERTY 138, 138 (Steven R. Munzer ed., 2001) (finding intellectual property
a poor fit with Lockean theory, though not on grounds of the proviso).
214. See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 136, at 640–41 (arguing that a trademark’s producer has the best claim to the mark’s commercial value, even if
that value arises in the merchandising context); McCarthy, supra note 48, at
3367–68 (using the language of property to defend post-sale confusion doctrine).
215. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 815 (1935) (“The current legal argument runs:
One who by the ingenuity of his advertising or the quality of his product has
induced consumer responsiveness to a particular name, symbol, form of packaging, etc., has thereby created a thing of value; a thing of value is property;
the creator of property is entitled to protection against third parties who seek
to deprive him of his property.”).
216. Id.; see also Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual
Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 178–80 (1992)
(identifying numerous critiques of the “if value then right” argument).
217. Dreyfuss, supra note 191, at 400–12.
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sort of social welfare calculus,” and resisted if this cannot be
218
persuasively done. I submit that the same holds true for status confusion.
The argument in the status-confusion cases is that the value of Veblen brands lies in their exclusivity. Interfering with
the mark owner’s ability to maintain artificial conditions of
scarcity in order to cultivate that image of exclusivity lessens
the value of such marks and thereby, it is argued, injures the
219
mark owner. But of course, the mark owner is only able to
maintain artificial conditions of scarcity because statusconfusion doctrine gives him the legal right to prevent others
from producing additional copies of his mark. Absent such a
right, there would be no way to maintain the artificial condition
of scarcity, and thus no way for marks to acquire value based
on such artificially maintained scarcity. Thus, the value that
the owners of Veblen brands—and the courts that side with
them—purport to be defending in the status confusion cases is
entirely a product of those cases themselves, rather than any
labor of the mark owner.
In sum, the moral-rights-based “property” justification for
status-confusion doctrine is inherently circular and ultimately
empty. Because the claim of mark owners in the status confusion cases places clear burdens on social expression, such
claims ought not to be justified on such ill-conceived Lockean
property rights grounds. Rather, the free-riding rationale must
220
be grounded in some “social welfare calculus,” some consequentialist argument that giving luxury brand owners a right
to exclude others from accessing their trademarks—even in the
absence of confusion of actual or potential purchasers—makes
society better off despite the expressive burden that the right
imposes on others.
2. The Incentive Thesis: A Copyright Analogy
A consequentialist take on the free-riding argument for
post-sale confusion might lead us to reframe the lemons prob218. Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH.
L. REV. 137, 181–84 (2010).
219. See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1238 (6th Cir. 1991)
(“Production of [Ferrari’s] cars is . . . intentionally limited to preserve exclusivity.”); id. at 1245 (“If the country is populated with hundreds, if not thousands,
of replicas of rare, distinct, and unique vintage cars, obviously they are no
longer unique.” (quoting Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabbriche Automobili v.
McBurnie, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1843, 1848 (S.D. Cal. 1989))).
220. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 218, at 181–84.
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lem discussed in Part II above as a different type of market
failure. In one view, we could see it as an example of the trage221
dy of the commons. It is possible that in the absence of legal
enforcement of Veblen brands, overconsumption would deplete
their signaling value. Returning to the argument from Au222
Tomotive Gold, we might therefore characterize status confusion as a free-riding problem. In the absence of status-confusion
liability, excessive free-riding might lead the creators of Veblen
brands to stop investing in their production. This is the public
223
goods issue framed by Professor Harrison. A consequentialist
free-riding argument in support of status-confusion doctrine
would therefore depend on two propositions: that Veblen
brands increase social welfare, and that giving their owners a
right to exclude others is a necessary inducement to their creation.
There are formal objections to this argument. In particular,
it is significant that Professor Harrison’s analysis explicitly re224
lies on the Constitution’s Progress Clause. With all due respect to Professor Harrison’s skilled economic and philosophical
analysis, here he has made an error of law. The Progress
Clause—which authorizes federal patent and copyright law—
has had no purchase on trademark law since the Trade-Mark
225
Cases. Rather, the Lanham Act is an exercise of Congress’s
226
Viewing the governpower under the Commerce Clause.
ment’s interest in the status confusion cases as arising under
the Progress Clause aligns Veblen brands more with copyright
227
law than with trademark law. While the Progress Clause’s
221. For the classic account of the free-rider problem, see Garrett Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
222. Supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
223. Supra notes 118–25 and accompanying text.
224. Harrison, supra note 22, at 220–21 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8) (giving Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”))).
225. 100 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1879).
226. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The word ‘commerce’ means all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.”).
227. There are similar formal objections to viewing the government support
for Veblen brands as part of copyright policy—the useful articles doctrine chief
among them. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Brandir Int’l v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co.,
834 F.2d 1142, 1143 (1987). Of course, fashion designers—perhaps the primary producers of Veblen brands—have long but as yet unsuccessfully sought to
circumvent these formal barriers with sui generis protection. Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, S. 3728, 111th Cong. (2010); Design
Piracy Prohibition Act, S. 1957, 110th Cong. (2007).
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policy of generating new works of creative expression might
significantly inform the relationship between copyright law and
228
the First Amendment, no similar authority suggests that the
federal government has an interest in encouraging the production of new, symbolic expressions of hierarchical social status—
indeed, the Title of Nobility Clause suggests precisely the oppo229
site.
Even if such a policy could be fairly characterized as regu230
lation of commerce (a dubious proposition) the two premises
of the consequentialist free-riding argument in favor of the policy are flawed. First, the very premise that economic incentives
are required in order to ensure the production of new intangible
231
goods is under increasing attack. Second, as discussed above,
the alternative to enforcement of Veblen brands is not necessarily a lemons-like market failure; absent legal intervention it
is highly likely that either a fashion-like cycle of short-lived
232
or naturally scarce resources
status signals would arise,
would come to meet the demand for status signals, as they did
233
in Veblen’s day. Third, there is a strong argument that whatever incentive is properly attributed to trademark rights is no
more than the incentive inherent in market competition—all
trademarks do is allow the incentives of competition to work

228. See generally Tushnet, Copyright as a Model, supra note 199 (considering issues of copyright ownership in the context of the First Amendment).
229. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by
the United States.”).
230. See supra notes 175–84 and accompanying text; see also supra note
201.
231. See Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces:
Should Thomas Keller ’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 1121 (2007); Blake Fry, Why Typefaces Proliferate Without Copyright Protection, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 425 (2010); Dotan Oliar &
Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Any More): The Emergence of
Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94
VA. L. REV. 1787 (2008); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy
Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L.
REV. 1687 (2006); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and
Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 521 (2009) (“Creativity, as lived, is more than a response to incentives, working from fixed and
random preferences.”); cf. Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://www.law
.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Expressive_Incentives_in_
Intellectual_Property.pdf.
232. See generally Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21; Raustiala &
Sprigman, supra note 231.
233. Supra notes 192–201 and accompanying text; infra Part III.C.3.
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234

properly. Fourth, current economic and sociological research
suggests that the owners of luxury brands have an incentive to
permit at least some degree of counterfeiting, because doing so
235
can actually increase the value of their brands.
Finally, and most importantly, it is unclear that Veblen
brands generate positive social value at all. This is primarily
because the value of Veblen brands, unlike the value of a work
of authorship, is positional, not instrumental; relative, not ab236
solute. Certainly a successful claim of social status may provide the claimant with positive utility. But it also requires that
social actors other than the successful claimant accept a lower
social status—that they experience negative utility. The aggregate positive utility of the segment of society that has access to
Veblen brands is highly unlikely to exceed the aggregate disutility of all individuals excluded from access to Veblen brands,
given the relative size of the two populations. But even if net
social utility were positive, social mobility and the waxing and
waning power of individual Veblen brands generate a cycle of
iterative (and costly) one-upsmanship that dissipates rather
237
than creates social value. In sum, this “social welfare calculus” does not provide a convincing justification for the expressive burdens of status-confusion doctrine.

234. Dreyfuss, supra note 191, at 399 (“[T]he justifications supporting other intellectual property rights, such as patents and copyrights, do not apply to
expressive uses of trademarks because free ridership on the commercial aspect
of marks is not a problem and besides, there is little need to create economic
incentives to encourage businesses to develop a vocabulary with which to conduct commerce.”); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 218, at 172–77.
235. Barnett, supra note 22, at 1398–1408 (explaining how counterfeit
products increase the “snob premium”); cf. Gosline, supra note 106, at 1–48
(analyzing the impact of counterfeit consumption on consumers of the authentic product).
236. Barnett, supra note 22, at 1386; see also Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1–18 (1992) ( providing an overview of the current economic analysis of relative preferences).
237. Barnett, supra note 22, at 1414 –18. It is notable, if unsurprising, that
one of the leading economic models exploring conspicuous consumption must
assume, rather than derive, the optimal value of a trademark in order to reach
any useful conclusions. Higgins & Rubin, supra note 115, at 218. But see MASON, supra note 108, at 1–11 (setting forth the argument that this iterative
process of consumption generates economic activity on the supply side of the
market that increases a society’s overall wealth) (citing BERNARD
MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES: OR, PRIVATE VICES, PUBLICK BENEFITS (1714)).
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3. The Efficiency Thesis: Diverting Demand
Despite the inadequacy of free-riding arguments, there
may yet be a legitimate government interest that can justify
status-confusion doctrine pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
All of the foregoing analysis is subject to an important objection: Veblen brands are not responsible for the unequal allocation of access to the means of expressing a claim to social sta238
tus. If Veblen is to be believed, there will always be demand
for symbols to express the message of superior social status,
both by people with wealth and by people without it. In Veblen’s day, this demand was satisfied through material waste—
239
waste of labor, waste of precious materials, waste of time.
The great innovation of Veblen brands is that they enable conspicuous consumption without requiring the waste of naturally
scarce resources.
Perhaps, then, the most salient government interest in the
market for Veblen brands is that it prevents the diversion of
resources from socially valuable productive uses to socially
240
wasteful competitive consumption. For example, platinum
241
probably generates more social value in hydrogen fuel cells
242
than in “grillz.” If there must be competitive consumption, it
is likely in society’s—and the government’s—interest that such
consumption not divert needed resources from more productive
238. Lunney, supra note 21, at 468 (“[T]o the extent that one good loses
value as a signifier of prestige, a new prestige good will arise to take its place.
As a result, increasing the supply of one prestige good, even if it entails the
complete destruction of the good’s value for purposes of prestige, does not represent an economic loss, but a transfer of prestige value from the old standard
to the new.”).
239. See supra notes 138–43 and accompanying text.
240. Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 882 (“[A]s the production
and consumption of immaterial status goods in the non-virtual world intensifies under the auspices of intellectual property law, the costs to society of this
zero-sum struggle are becoming very real. Resources better spent elsewhere,
perhaps in the pursuit of absolute utility or ‘Progress,’ are instead spent in
pursuit of intangible and otherwise typically quite meaningless and useless
forms of relative utility.”); id at 826–27 (citing Ben Cooper et al., Status Effects
and Negative Utility Growth, 111 ECON. J. 642, 643 (2001)); Robert H. Frank,
Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable Welfare Losses, 95 AM.
ECON. REV. 137 (2005).
241. Brian C.H. Steele & Angelika Heinzel, Materials for Fuel-Cell Technologies, 414 NATURE 345, 347 (2001) (“The second important problem is associated with the electrocatalyst. For operation with pure hydrogen and air,
platinum is the most active material.”).
242. See Nelly et al., Grillz (2005), available at http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=8fijggq5R6w&ob=av2e (“I got like platinum and white gold, traditional gold/I’m changin’ grillz every day, like Jay change clothes.”).
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243

segments of the economy. Such diversion could drive up the
costs of inputs into productive economic activity and thus reduce the overall level of that activity. Viewed in this light, establishing and maintaining a market for Veblen brands could
be considered a roundabout way of regulating commerce in
244
more socially valuable and naturally scarce resources.
The most difficult question posed by status-confusion doctrine, then, is whether this benefit—which is undeniably a substantial one—justifies the doctrine’s costs. We might approach
this problem strictly on the basis of economic analysis. We
might ask: what would be the increased cost to productive users of acquiring naturally scarce goods that have become targets of conspicuous consumption where such consumption has
no outlet to artificially scarce Veblen brands? And then we
might compare that amount to the cost of perpetuating the status confusion regime—in terms of administrative costs to government and litigants, for example. We might even expand the
scope of our economic analysis to consider the aggregate utility
and disutility experienced by competitors in the market for so245
cial status. Any of these approaches reduces the constitutionality of status-confusion doctrine to an empirical question as to
which the relevant data are necessarily unavailable.
243. Rory Sutherland, Please Can You Refute This Argument, CAMPAIGN
BLOG (Nov. 14, 2007, 9:18 PM), http://campaignblog.campaignlive.co.uk/2007/
11/14/please-can-you-refute-this-argument/ (“Brands are, after all, gloriously
intangible. You can build a brand without killing trees and few precious raw
materials are needed in their creation. The exploitation of child labour in making brands is rare. And yet brand value creates pleasure and confers status as
surely as any more wasteful (i.e., tangible) value. It may seem bizarre to say
it, but brands actually succeed in making us happy with less. That is precisely
why they make money for the people who own them.”); Rory Sutherland, Life
Lessons from an Ad Man, http://www.ted.com/talks/rory_sutherland_life_
lessons_from_an_ad_man.html (“If you think about it, if you want to live in a
world in the future where there are fewer material goods, you basically have
two choices. You can either live in a world which is poorer, which people in
general don’t like. Or you can live in a world where actually intangible value
constitutes a greater part of overall value, that actually intangible value, in
many ways is a very, very fine substitute for using up labor or limited resources in the creation of things.”).
244. Of course, this argument assumes that the impulse for social competition will not be channeled into pursuits other than consumption—competitive
philanthropy, for example, or competitive production. See Beebe, Sumptuary
Code, supra note 21, at 884 –87. Personally, I am of the view that Veblen’s observations on the universality and the unquenchability of the impulse to competitive consumption—observations that find ample analogues in contemporary society, see supra note 114—are strong support of this assumption.
245. Supra notes 236–43 and accompanying text.
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But there is an argument that economic analysis is out of
place, or at least insufficient, in this context. This argument
places the First Amendment in a “preferred position” as against
246
countervailing interests—particularly economic interests.
Whether such a preference is grounded in values such as individual autonomy and self-fulfillment or on the interests of the
community in fully informed social and political deliberation
(two views of the First Amendment that are sometimes in con247
flict), it requires special solicitude for the expressive interests
of individuals in social discourse. According to this view, marginal and unprovable decreases in aggregate utility are simply
not a good enough justification for interfering with the expressive rights of a significant portion of the community on issues of
248
social concern. This is particularly so where that portion of
the community loses those rights so that another portion of the
community can enjoy greater expressive freedom than it would
otherwise have. Given a choice between a system in which burdens on expression and associated reductions in aggregate welfare are allocated by the state and a system in which those
burdens and costs are allocated by background social and eco-

246. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, J., dissenting);
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 906 (1963) (“The Court’s obligation to bow to the will of the legislature and the executive is at a minimum where a serious claim to infringement of freedom of expression on the part of those institutions is presented. In
this sense, from the judicial point of view, freedom of expression should be regarded as a ‘preferred freedom.’”). See generally Robert B. McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182 (1959).
247. Compare Emerson, supra note 246, at 879–81 (noting the First
Amendment value of self-fulfillment), with ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (1948) (“Just so far as, at
any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance
with information . . . which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must
be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed.”). But see BeVier, supra note 167, at 317–
22 (criticizing the “self-fulfillment” principle as a useful basis for First
Amendment law). See generally Fiss, supra note 205 (comparing a First
Amendment theory grounded in autonomy with one grounded in preserving
the integrity of public debate).
248. Cf. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (“The First
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of
speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.
The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that
the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our
Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.”).
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nomic forces, the First Amendment counsels us to opt for the
latter system.
Ultimately, this last justification for status-confusion doctrine is the only one that is even arguably persuasive, and it
brings us to a fundamental conflict of normative and social allegiances. There is something duplicitous and subversive in
consumption of counterfeit Veblen brands, but there is also
something imperious and undemocratic in legal action to
thwart that consumption. The interests behind any policy
choice in this space are fundamentally incommensurate: on one
side are economic interests, and on the other side are social and
expressive interests. I have argued that the latter interests, being of constitutional dimension, ought to outweigh the former
interests, which are ill defined and of dubious weight. But even
those who disagree ought to recognize that status-confusion
doctrine is highly suspicious as a matter of commerce policy. In
the next Section, I offer policy solutions to accommodate either
reaction to my analysis.
D. TWO PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
For those who, like me, believe that status-confusion doctrine fails to justify itself, the appropriate policy response is
straightforward: status confusion should be eliminated as a basis for trademark liability. As a mechanism for achieving this
end, I propose a narrowly tailored defense that would do away
with status-confusion liability without affecting other forms of
trademark liability—even other forms of post-sale confusion liability. This new defense would permit a trademark infringement defendant to assert the First Amendment interests of its
customers as a complete defense to liability for trademark infringement or counterfeiting if—but only if—an interpretation
of the Lanham Act that encompasses status confusion is a necessary condition for the imposition of such liability.
Importantly, this defense would not require that defendants be immunized from liability on other grounds—where an
interpretation of the Lanham Act that encompasses status con249
fusion is merely a sufficient condition for liability. If the doc249. This feature of my proposal is self-consciously designed to invoke the
principle of constitutional avoidance, extirpating status-confusion liability as a
matter of statutory interpretation of the Lanham Act rather than injecting
First Amendment analysis into every trademark case in which socially expressive consumption might be in evidence. Cf. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The Court will not pass
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trinal exposition of Part I establishes nothing else, it establishes that precision in defining the nature of the injury in cases
that have heretofore been labeled “post-sale confusion” cases is
paramount. There may be—almost certainly will be—cases in
which a status-confusion plaintiff could establish likelihood of
confusion under some other theory. If so, the First Amendment
interests of the defendants’ customers would not be implicated—indeed those customers would likely be either perpetrators
or victims of actionable confusion themselves. Forcing courts
and litigants to draw the distinction between status-confusion
250
and other theories of trademark infringement should have
the salutary effect of assuring that any premium enjoyed by the
mark owner reflects value that he himself has created, rather
than the value that some consumers place on state-enforced restriction of the social expression of others.
Finally, even those who come away unpersuaded by the
constitutional analysis set forth above might, I hope, be persuaded that status-confusion doctrine strikes a poor balance
even between the purely economic forces it attempts to regulate. Moreover, because I recognize that a proposal that would
essentially legitimize counterfeiting presents problems of political economy (to put it mildly), I would propose an alternative
solution to the problem of status confusion, though the alternative may fare no better on this score. I propose that, if we cannot bring ourselves to reject Veblen brands, at the very least we
should be able to agree that the “social welfare calculus” described above suggests that we ought not subsidize them, which
is what we are doing under current law. To the contrary, they
seem like an ideal target for Pigouvian taxation and redistribu251
tion. Given Veblen brands’ high social cost, we ought to reupon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if
there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed
of . . . . Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a
constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.”).
250. This analysis obviously does not address the question whether a dilution claim might provide a trademark owner with similar relief to a statusconfusion claim, and, if so, whether the First Amendment should similarly
provide a defense to such a dilution claim. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c) (2006 &
Supp. 2010). While these questions are important, they are beyond the scope
of this Article.
251. See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172–203 (4th ed.
1962) ( proposing a system of taxes and bounties to force private parties to internalize externalities). See generally William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the
Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1972) (defending and formal-
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quire that those costs be internalized by the status-confusion
doctrine’s beneficiaries—the owners of Veblen brands and their
customers.
At the level of doctrine, this proposal would, at a minimum,
imply cessation of publicly funded enforcement of statusconfusion claims, taking the burden off law- and border252
enforcement agencies to monitor for counterfeiting. It would
probably also imply that damages be made unavailable as a
remedy in status-confusion cases, limiting recovery to injunc253
tive relief. Indeed, full internalization of the costs of Veblen
brands might suggest that even the successful status-confusion
plaintiff ought to be compelled to compensate his defendant (or,
in the spirit of Pigouvian taxation, the public) for the value of
merchandise seized, and perhaps court costs and attorneys’
fees, depending on the magnitude of the resulting moral-hazard
problem in the counterfeit market. One would expect that these
costs, imposed on the owners of Veblen brands, would be passed
on to their customers in the form of even higher prices for already high-priced goods. In this way, the market might serve to
compel consumers to pay the socially optimal price for what
they are really buying when they purchase a Veblen brand:
governmental suppression of their neighbors’ social expression.
CONCLUSION
Courts’ and commentators’ failure to distinguish among
the various theories of injury that fall under the heading of
“post-sale confusion” has, to date, made the doctrine something
of a moving target. This imprecision has made principled application of the doctrine difficult, generating arbitrariness in the
post-sale confusion cases. Outcomes can be and often appear to
be manipulated by emphasizing one theory of injury or down-

izing Pigou’s insight in models that account for the possibility of Coasean bargaining).
252. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (2006) ( providing for customs interdiction of infringing articles); 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2006) (establishing criminal liability for trafficking in counterfeit goods). This proposal is contradicted by the economic
analysis of Higgins and Rubin, see supra note 115, who find that public enforcement is preferable to private enforcement from a welfare-maximization
standpoint. However, it is notable that Higgins and Rubin fail to provide a
method for valuing a Veblen brand, declining to consider the disutility of consumers who must accept lower social status as a result of the enforcement of
Veblen brands. Id.
253. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2006) (imposing or increasing monetary penalties
for trademark infringement and counterfeiting).
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254

playing another. Some commentators have cited this arbitrariness as evidence of ulterior motives—courts, it is argued, use
the language of competition to mask concern over misappropri255
ation of the non-reputation-related value of trademarks.
This Article avoided such subjective causal explanations
for the confused state of post-sale confusion doctrine, instead
taking those opinions at face value and analyzing them critically. This approach resulted in the identification of three distinct
theories of post-sale confusion. Still, each of these theories has
serious flaws. Bystander confusion, while theoretically sound,
needs further doctrinal development: in its current form, it
merely invites abuse in the form of causal speculation. Downstream confusion, in contrast, is simply a tangle of doctrinal inconsistency. In particular, it runs afoul of numerous longstanding bodies of trademark law, including Supreme Court
precedent.
I have proposed fairly modest doctrinal changes to remedy
the deficiencies in these two theories. With respect to bystander
256
confusion, my proposed changes address the mechanics rather than the substance of the extant doctrine—for example,
shifting burdens and discarding (perhaps unspoken) presump254. For example, the First Circuit criticized a district court’s analysis of a
post-sale confusion claim as “based on an erroneous premise. In finding that
post-sale confusion was unlikely, the court commented that ‘there is little or
no chance that [the faucets] will be resold to unwary consumers.’ Post-sale
confusion refers not to the resale of the original product, however, but to the
risk that non-purchasers, who themselves may be future consumers, will be
deceived.” IP Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 44 (1st Cir. 1998)
(internal citation omitted). The district court’s reasoning was perfectly consistent with the downstream-confusion theory discussed in Part I.B., supra.
Nevertheless, the First Circuit assigned error to that reasoning, opting instead
for a bystander-confusion theory. Id. Other courts have engaged in similar
blurring of lines between distinct theories of post-sale confusion, typically to
avoid a finding against a trademark owner. See, e.g., supra notes 42–44 and
accompanying text.
255. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also Bone, supra note
46, at 593 (“Often, [the misappropriation theory] serves essentially as makeweight, adding nothing significant to a decision adequately supported by information transmission policies. Sometimes it does a bit more work by seeming to make judges feel more comfortable accepting tenuous confusion-based or
consumer-oriented arguments. And sometimes, in those cases involving the
very broadest expansions, misappropriation plays a more central role in driving judges to fashion novel confusion theories and to apply them in questionable ways.”).
256. See generally William McGeveran, Life in the Fast Lane: Of Presumptions, Defenses, and Burdens, 1 I.P. THEORY 25 (2011) (arguing that not just
the substance but the mechanics of trademark law analysis can have a strong
influence on both administrative costs and substantive outcomes).
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tions to ensure that bystander confusion is consistent with other areas of trademark law. With respect to downstream confusion, I have proposed discarding the obfuscatory label of “postsale confusion,” and suggested that courts apply traditional
contributory-infringement and first-sale doctrine analysis.
With these relatively minor changes, bystander- and downstream-confusion theories could be repurposed to target the
confusion of actual or potential purchasers. Of course, continuing to refer to such reformulated doctrines as “post-sale confusion” would likely be a mis-description.
The status-confusion cases, in contrast, do not lend themselves to such trivial doctrinal adjustment. They present a theory unique in trademark law, one which turns the economic rationale for trademark protection into a rationale for
governmental regulation of social expression. I have coined the
term “Veblen brands” for trademarks that serve this socially
expressive function. In this Article, I have argued that using
government authority to maintain the market for Veblen
brands is not only inconsistent with the policies underlying
trademark law, but is also in tension with the First Amendment. Because the government interest in enforcing Veblen
brands is outweighed by the substantial and unequal burden
such enforcement imposes on the social expression of already
socially disadvantaged speakers, I conclude that statusconfusion doctrine should be discarded entirely, or, at the very
least, significantly curtailed.

